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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether punitive damages can be awarded in a products
liability case is not a new question. As early as 1852 the Ken-
tucky court answered this query in the affirmative. In Fleet v.
Hollenkemp,1 the plaintiff became violently ill after taking a
1. 52 Ky. 175, 13 B. Mon. 219 (1852).
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concoction prescribed by his doctor but negligently prepared
by the pharmacist. Traces of poison had been inadvertently
mixed in with the medicine. The plaintiff brought an action in
case to recover compensatory and punitive damages. The de-
fendant argued that punitive damages were inappropriate in
an action in case because it is an indirect action involving no
intent to harm the plaintiff. The court was not persuaded by
this argument and upheld the punitive damages award, stat-
ing that it is the conduct of a defendant which is critical to a
punitive damages award, not the form of action.
This reasoning was recently affirmed in the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court case of Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.8 Wangen in-
volved injuries sustained in a Ford Mustang rear-end collision.
The Mustang's fuel tank ruptured, resulting in the death of
two of the passengers and severe injuries to the other two pas-
sengers. The court, responding to Ford's argument that puni-
tive damages could not be assessed in an action based on neg-
ligence or strict liability because these bases of liability did
not involve intentional conduct, stated: "[P]unitive damages
depend on the nature of the wrongdoer's conduct, not on the
nature of the tort on which compensatory damage is based
There has been considerable debate among commentators
over the threshold issue of whether punitive damages are in-
compatible with product liability actions.5 Generally, there are
three possible theories of recovery in a product liability case:
negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability.6 It has been
argued that actions based on strict liability or breach of war-
ranty cannot support a punitive damages claim because they
are nonfault concepts and fault is a critical element of puni-
tive damages. However, courts have refused to recognize the
2. Id. at 180, 13 B. Mon. at 225-26.
3. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
4. Id. at 275, 294 N.W.2d at 446.
5. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. Rzv.
1257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen]; Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Lia-
bility, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tozer]; Fulton, Punitive
Damages in Product Liability Cases, 15 FORUM 117 (Fall 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Fulton].
6. Defense Research Institute Monograph, Products Liability, Defense of a Prod-




incompatibility argument.1 Usually, all three theories of liabil-
ity or a combination thereof are pled in the alternative in a
products case. Because of the prevalent use of the general ver-
dict, it is often difficult if not impossible to ascertain the basis
for the punitive damages award. Normally, the discussion of
punitive damages is limited to whether the standard for
awarding them has been met. This indicates that the courts
are not always concerned with the threshold question of
whether punitive damages are recoverable under any particu-
lar theory of product liability.
An example of the failure of the courts to consider the un-
derlying basis of a cause of action for punitive damages is Vol-
lert v. Summa Corp.8 This case involved a product liability
action arising out of a helicopter accident at the Honolulu
Airport. The plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturer of
the helicopter, alleging negligence, strict liability and breach
of warranty. The issue was whether the defendant could be
required to answer interrogatories in regard to wealth before
liability had been established. The defendant argued that in-
formation about his wealth was inadmissible because punitive
damages were inappropriate in a product liability action." The
court ruled in favor of discovery without indicating what the-
ory of liability would be the basis for recovery, if any.
In order to justify punitive damages the defendant's con-
duct must be willful or wanton or exhibit a reckless disregard
for the rights of others. 10 Normally, product liability cases do
not involve intentional conduct or malice. Therefore, punitive
damages have to be established on the basis of a reckless dis-
regard for consequences on the part of the defendant. This
results in additional proof other than what is needed to estab-
lish compensatory damages on the basis of strict liability,
breach of warranty or negligence.
In Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp.," an action was
brought to recover for severe facial disfigurement incurred by
a child as a result of a chemical burn from spilled liquid drain
cleaner. The manufacturer was found negligent in the formu-
7. Owen, supra note 5, at 1269.
8. 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975).
9. Id. at 1350.
10. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 249, 251 (1965).
11. 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
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lation of the product and in failing to test. In addition the
manufacturer was also found guilty of breach of an express
warranty, breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
and in strict liability. Compensatory damages of $1,100,000
were awarded, but the court refused to allow any punitive
damages. The theory of the court was that the defendant's
conduct was not of sufficient gravity to allow an award of pu-
nitive damages under Ohio law. In addition, the court found
there was no further need for the award of punitive damages
as a deterrent since the original corporation had been taken
over by a new corporation which had immediately set out to
make the drain cleaner safe for home use. Implicit in the deci-
sion is that the court would allow an award of punitive dam-
ages if the conduct was serious enough and the deterrent
value of the award was clear.
II. NEGLIGENCE
Less criticism has been evoked against awarding punitive
damages in product liability cases based on negligence than
under the other possible theories of recovery. Undoubtedly
this is because the incompatibility argument waged against re-
covery in strict liability and breach of warranty cases is not as
relevant. Negligence centers around a finding of fault on the
part of the defendant. However, mere negligence does not jus-
tify a punitive damage award. 12 In order to recover punitive
damages, conduct in excess of negligence must be established.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the standard for
awarding punitive damages as "reckless indifference to the
rights of others and conscious action in deliberate disregard of
them."
'13
Discounting any policy argument against assessing puni-
tive damages in product liability cases, there should be no
technical difficulty in attaining a punitive damage award in a
jurisdiction which recognizes a distinction in kind between
gross negligence and ordinary negligence. The evidence neces-
sary to sustain a finding of gross negligence can also sustain a
12. Gombas v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958); Hibschman Pon-
tiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 340 N.E.2d 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). See 22 AM. JuR. 2D Dam-
ages § 251 (1965).
13. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment b at 465 (1977).
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punitive damage award. Therefore, in a state which still dis-
tinguishes between ordinary negligence and "gross negligence"
it is basically a policy decision whether punitive damages will
be awarded.
There is a paucity of cases which illustrate that punitive
damages are appropriate in product liability cases based on
negligence. This is because most products liability actions are
brought in strict liability or in a combination of legal theories
pled in the alternative. 14 Normally, the courts merely discuss
whether the standard for punitive damages has been met, but
in Rinker v. Ford Motor Co. 15 the court specifically addressed
the issue of punitive damages awards in product liability
cases. In Rinker, the plaintiff was engaged in a test drive of a
used Ford LTD when the accelerator stuck due to the break-
age of the fast idle cam. The plaintiff lost control of the car
and collided with another vehicle, sustaining personal injury.
The plaintiff brought suit in strict liability against Ford and
the car dealership, and in negligent failure to warn against
Ford. The jury found Ford liable for $100,000 compensatory
damages and $460,000 punitive damages. The car dealer was
found not liable. Although a general verdict was used both the
appellant and respondent took the position on appeal that the
jury found Ford liable only on the negligence count. One of
the issues on appeal was whether punitive damages were ap-
propriate in a product liability case. The court examined the
arguments against punitive damages but was not persuaded
by them. It made a strong statement in support of awarding
punitive damages:
However, given the purpose of punitive damages to punish a
defendant for an aggravated act of misconduct and to deter
similar conduct in the future by the defendants and others,
there is no fundamental reason for excluding product liabil-
ity cases from the cases in which punitive damages can be
recovered.16
In deciding whether to allow punitive damages, the court
noted that "the important factor is the conduct which was
14. Fulton, supra note 5, at 129-30.
15. 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
16. Id. at 668.
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found to warrant the imposition of punitive damages."17 The
court was convinced that Ford's failure to take any action af-
ter receiving twenty-nine reports of similar incidents exhib-
ited the requisite conduct to sustain a punitive damage award.
In Moore v. Jewel Tea Co.,1 8 the plaintiff was blinded
when a can of Drano exploded. She initiated an action in
strict liability and negligence. The jury found the manufac-
turer liable for $900,000 actual damages and $10,000 punitive
damages. Although the court did not discuss the issue of puni-
tive damages, the case has been cited as precedent to indicate
the appropriateness of such an award in a negligence case.1"
Other cases where an award of punitive damages was re-
versed on appeal or where such damages were not awarded
bolster the contention that if the requisite conduct can be es-
tablished a punitive damage award is warranted.20 In Ellis v.
Colconda Corp.,21 bystanders were injured when liquid petro-
leum escaped from a truck. The appellate court overturned
the $70,000 punitive damages award, holding that there was
not a satisfactory evidentiary basis to sustain it. The fact that
the driver abandoned the scene of the accident and that the
truck was kept in service after the manager knew the auto-
matic shut-off valve was not working did not constitute
"recklessness. '22
From the few cases that have dealt with the subject, it can
be concluded that if the conduct involved, over and above the
original negligence, warrants an award of punitive damages
the courts will allow it.
17. Id. at 667.
18. 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 I 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d
103 (1970).
19. Annot., 29 A.L.R. 3d 1021 (Later Case Service)(1979).
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Auto
Specialties Mfg. Co. v. Boutwell, 335 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 358 So. 2d
1339 (Fla. 1978).
21. 352 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). See also Knippen v. Ford Motor
Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15 (TeL Civ.
App. 1977).
22. 352 So. 2d at 1225.
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III. BREACH OF WARRANTY
To establish liability in a breach of warranty action, the
plaintiff must prove that there was a warranty, that it was
breached and that damages resulted. 2 Traditional drawbacks
to bringing an action in breach of warranty are the notice and
privity requirements and the use of disclaimers by manufac-
turers. Most states have abolished the privity requirement 4
but notice and the use of disclaimers are still stumbling blocks
to breach of warranty recovery.
These general obstacles, coupled with the requirements for
recovering punitive damages, form a formidable barrier to re-
covery of punitive damages in product liability cases based on
breach of warranty. Several jurisdictions view breach of war-
ranty as a contract action. In the majority of jurisdictions, pu-
nitive damages are not recoverable in a contract action.25
However, product liability cases brought in breach of war-
ranty are often viewed as a combination of tort and contract,
thus forming a potential basis for the recovery of punitive
damages.
Section 1-106(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code
provides:
The remedies provided by the Act shall be liberally adminis-
tered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as
good a position as if the other party had fully performed but
neither consequential nor penal damages may be had except
as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.
All states except Louisiana have adopted the U.C.C. It ap-
pears from section 1-106(1) that punitive damages are not al-
lowed in breach of warranty cases. However, Professor Owen
suggests that this interpretation is too narrow and that if the
courts are convinced that public policy warrants allowing pu-
nitive damages in product liability cases brought in warranty,
they will get around the wording of section 1-106(1).21
23. Defense Research Institute Monograph, Products Liability, Defense of a Prod-
ucts Case, Vol. 1978, No. 5 (Dec. 1978).
24. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). Wisconsin continues to require privity in breach of warranty actions. See
Smith v. Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 383 n.2, 94 N.W.2d 697, 704 n.2 (1959).
25. Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 340 N.E.2d 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
See also Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 486-87 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
26. Owen, supra note 5, at 1275-77.
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No court has awarded punitive damages in a product lia-
bility action based solely on a breach of warranty. However,
there are cases based on both negligence and breach of war-
ranty wherein punitive damages were awarded without any
discussion of whether it was inappropriate in the breach of
warranty action. These cases indicate again that the courts are
not too concerned with the underlying cause of action in their
determination of whether punitive damages should be
allowed.
In Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware Co.,27 the plaintiff was
injured when a stepladder he was standing on collapsed. The
plaintiff brought an action for breach of warranty and failure
to warn. The jury assessed $13,500 compensatory damages
and $18,500 punitive damages against Werner, the manufac-
turer of the ladder. On review, the court determined that
there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict against the
manufacturer. The ladder was warranted to be "good quality:
Light - Strong - Safe; Rated Load 200 lbs."28 The plaintiff
weighed only 165 pounds and the ladder was being used prop-
erly when it collapsed. The court held that because Werner
had received five reports of similar accidents and had modi-
fied other ladders without taking any action to improve the
safety of this ladder or to warn of its danger, punitive dam-
ages were justified.
Another product liability case brought in negligence and
breach of warranty was Hafner v. Guerlain, Inc.29 The plain-
tiff in Hafner suffered a reaction to Shalimar perfume. The
trial court awarded $8,000 in punitive damages. On appeal,
the court held that the award was not justified because the
reaction of the plaintiff to the perfume was an abnormal one.
Although not conclusive, these cases support the conten-
tion that whatever the theory of recovery, punitive damages
are allowable if the requisite conduct exists. Professor Owen
advocates this approach, stating that the decision to award
punitive damages is essentially a policy decision. If the courts
are persuaded that manufacturers need to be deterred from
irresponsible behavior, they will assess punitive damages even
27. 226 Kan. 681, 602 P.2d 1326 (1979).
28. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 1329.
29. 34 A.D.2d 162, 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1970).
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In general, the standard of conduct required before a de-
fendant becomes liable for punitive damages has been vari-
ously described as intentional, willful, wanton or exhibiting
reckless, malicious or conscious disregard of others' rights or
safety. The punitive standard, however described, will trans-
late into specifically defined conduct when applied to a prod-
uct liability action. The defective product manufacturer, oper-
ating in vastly different circumstances than the typical
defendant who has been guilty of reckless conduct, 1 will re-
quire a unique description of what specific conduct will render
it liable for punitive damages.
The imposition of punitive damages in a product liability
case creates special problems and therefore the number of de-
cisions involving such damages is not great.2 A product liabil-
ity action may involve a mass producer of a particular item;
therefore, the marketing of a single defective product line may
create the possibility of multiple injuries and plaintiffs num-
bering in the thousands.3 The potential exposure for compen-
satory damages alone, without the additional assessment of
punitive damages, is staggering and could conceivably force a
manufacturer into bankruptcy. With such potential exposure,
significant public policy questions emerge concerning the de-
sirability of awarding punitive damages in a product liability
case.3
4
30. Owen, supra note 5, at 1275.
31. The manufacturer operates in an environment which requires it to consider
economic and business factors in its decision-making process, while also operating in
a position to inflict great harm upon large numbers of consumers with a single defec-
tive product. The manufacturer also occupies an essential place in our economic sys-
tem in that it usually provides employment for a large number of persons and pro-
duces necessary or desired items for society's consumption.
32. One source notes the "paucity" of cases in the area. Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1021
(1970).
33. The most famous and most discussed example is the MER/29 litigation, which
involved 1500 claims filed against the manufacturer. Owen, supra note 5, at 1324.
34. Judge Friendly was the first to address this issue in Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
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In addition to the public policy considerations, some com-
mentators have questioned the legal consistency of awarding
punitive damages in a product liability case in which the
plaintiff has relied on strict liability as a theory of recovery. 5
Strict liability, of course, imposes liability on a party for the
mere sale of a defective product, regardless of the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's conduct. There is no examination of
the seller's conduct, only his product.
36
Punitive damages on the other hand, are awarded when
the defendant has injured another party by some type of egre-
gious conduct, whether it be called intentional, willful, wanton
or reckless.37 The court's prime area of focus is the defen-
dant's conduct. This dichotomy between the basis of liability
for punitive damages and strict liability has led commentators
to declare that the awarding of punitive damages in a strict
liability product suit is legally inconsistent and therefore
improper.
Finally, the awarding of punitive damages has been at-
tacked as an imposition of punishment without the provision
of required constitutional safeguards for defendants.3 8 Al-
though the context of a product liability case creates the pos-
sibility of the infliction of devastatingly severe penalties upon
35. See, e.g., Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases, 61
MARQ. L. REv. 245 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ghiardi & Koehn]; Synman, The Va-
lidity of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 44 INs. COUNSEL J. 402
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Snyman]. See also Justice Coffey's dissent in Wangen V.
Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
36. Strict liability as utilized by most courts is set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
§ 402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) -The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
37. The judicial standard employed will be discussed in § IV-E-1 of this article.
38. See notes 53-63 and accompanying text, infra.
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defending manufacturers, courts have consistently rejected
these arguments.
B. Roginsky v. Toole: The Battle Lines Form
Most commentators cite 1967 as the year in which the pu-
nitive damages/strict liability debate began. In that year, two
cases involving substantially identical facts and decided
within nine weeks of each other dramatically illustrated the
opposing viewpoints regarding the awardability of punitive
damages in products liability cases. The California Court of
Appeals, in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,"9 held that pu-
nitive damages were recoverable in a strict liability action,
while Judge Friendly, in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., stated in dicta that punitive damages should not be
recoverable. °
Although Roginsky and Toole mark the starting point of
contemporary debate concerning punitive damages in strict i-
ability actions, the punitive concept in a no-fault liability con-
text was recognized as early as 1870. Fleet v. Hollenkemp41
involved a drug retailer who had somehow permitted a poison-
ous drug to be mixed with a prescription of snake root and
Peruvian bark; the consumer of the prescription became sick
and a jury eventually awarded damages of $1,141.75. The de-
fendant argued on appeal that such damages were clearly ex-
cessive for the resultant short-term illness.
The plaintiff's cause of action was obviously not a strict
liability action as defined in section 402A of the Restatement,
but the defendant's liability, in the absence of any evidence as
to his negligence, was predicated upon his mere selling of the
defective drug.42 The similarity to today's strict liability ac-
tion is clear and therefore the court's comments on the
amount of the verdict are pertinent: "The damages given may
be more or less exemplary, or otherwise, as the circumstances
of aggravation or extenuation characterizing each particular
39. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
40. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
41. 52 Ky. 175, 13 B. Mon. 219 (1852).
42. The court articulated the "strict liability" of a druggist in this way. "It is a
well-established rule and principle of law, that a vendor of provisions for domestic
use is bound to know that they are sound and wholesome, at his peril." Id. at 181, 13
B. Mon. at 227 (emphasis in original).
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case may reasonably require. ' ' 43
Despite the Fleet case it was not until 1967 that the at-
tendant problems of exemplary damages in a product liability
case became glaringly apparent. The Toole and Roginsky
cases dealt with plaintiffs suing Richardson-Merrell for the
distribution of MER/29, a drug developed to lower blood cho-
lesterol levels. Unfortunately, MER/29 also induced the devel-
opment of cataracts in its users. The drug was administered to
approximately 400,000 persons, earning about $7 million for
Richardson-Merrell and leading to the reporting of 490 cat-
aract cases. 44 The facts described in the Toole opinion indi-
cated that the defendant had ignored tests of the drug which
showed cataract development in animals, had falsified reports
to the Food and Drug Administration and had misrepresented
the safety of MER/29 in advertising the drug to medical
groups.45 According to one commentator, there could hardly
be a more culpable party than Richardson-Merrell."
The trial court in the Roginsky case had awarded $100,000
in punitive damages, but the Second Circuit overturned the
verdict because the evidence had not been sufficient to submit
the punitive damage issue to the jury.47 Although this holding
would seem to make the court's criticism of the punitive dam-
ages concept mere dicta, such discussion was material to the
decision in that Judge Friendly justified his strict scrutiny of
the evidence on the basis of these public policy arguments.'
Judge Friendly stated that the mass distribution of products
creates the potential for lawsuits by hundreds of plaintiffs,.
thereby raising the possibility that the cumulative effect of
43. Id. at 180, 13 B. Mon. at 225.
44. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d at 698, 60 Cal. Rptr. at
408.
45. Id. at 694-98, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404-08.
46. Owen, supra note 5, at 1324: "[I]t is difficult to imagine a more extreme case
of such misbehavior than that of Richardson-Merrell in marketing MER/29. .. "
47. 378 F.2d at 839-43. The court stated that punitive damages were warranted
only when the defendant's conduct showed a conscious and deliberate disregard of
the interests of others, a recklessness close to criminality that had to be clearly estab-
lished. Applying this standard, the court said punitive damages were justified when
the defendant marketed a drug without any testing or when the defendant took no
action when a post-marketing danger became apparent. Punitive damages were not
justified when the defendant made a "gross" error in making the proper response to a
discovered defect.
48. Id. at 842.
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punitive damage awards would punish the defendant well be-
yond what was necessary for adequate punishment and deter-
rence, perhaps threatening the very economic life of the de-
fendant and thereby adversely affecting society as a whole.49
Judge Friendly's arguments against the imposition of punitive
damages in product liability cases can be summarized as
follows:
1. Multiple punitive damages awards would create liability
on the defendant well beyond the maximum criminal
penalty.
2. There is no practical way for a court to avoid the exces-
sive liability problem by cutting off other plaintiffs.
3. Liability for heavy compensatory damages awards and
criminal sanctions should serve as a sufficient deterrent to
manufacturers; defendant's insurance rates should increase
and its professional reputation should decline.
4. The cost of this unnecessary deterrence will fall on the
public in the form of higher product prices or bankrupt
businesses.
5. It is unfair to damage an innocent corporate share-
holder's financial investment when the fault lies with corpo-
rate personnel beyond his control.
The Roginsky decision and its reasoning would seem to set
a powerful precedent against the awarding of punitive dam-
ages in a product liability case. Two months later, however,
California rejected the Roginsky reasoning upon virtually
identical facts. The jury had awarded $500,000 punitive dam-
ages in Toole, but the trial judge reduced the award to
$250,000.50 The court of appeals upheld the punitive award,
rejected the Roginsky reasoning and stated that the defen-
dant's acts were performed recklessly and without regard to
injurious consequences.51
In Toole, the plaintiff had proceeded on distinct liability
theories of negligence, express warranty and implied warranty
(section 402A strict liability in California); the trial judge sub-
mitted a general verdict to the jury and therefore it is uncer-
49. Id. at 839: "The legal difficulties engendered by claims for punitive damages
on the part of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering." The Roginsky case was the first
of 75 cases pending before the Southern District of New York.
50. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 693, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
51. Id. at 705-06, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415-16.
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tain upon which theory the jury based its finding of liability.2
Since Toole was a product liability case it serves as a seminal
case for courts awarding punitive damages in a strict liability
situation.
C. Public Policy Issues
This section will discuss each of the Roginsky arguments
in light of subsequent court cases and scholarly works. It will
also point out additional arguments and considerations
presented by other sources as the punitive damages debate
has gained momentum.
1. Punishment Greater Than Any Criminal Penalty
It is almost a legal truism that the purpose of awarding
punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter him
and others similarly situated from performing similar acts
again.5 3 Critics of these goals have argued that punishment
and deterrence are proper goals of the criminal justice system,
not the civil tort law. 4 Constitutional attacks against the
awarding of punitive damages have been made along .two basic
fronts. The first constitutional attack is that punitive damages
in a strict liability case violate the defendant's constitutional
due process rights by imposing a punishment without provid-
ing the defendant with normal criminal defense rights, e.g.,
the reasonable doubt burden of proof, double jeopardy protec-
tion and the right to remain silent; these protections against
arbitrary punishment are not provided in a civil suit.5 5 The
second constitutional argument is that due process rights are
violated by an award of punitive damages because the stan-
52. Id. at 698, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
53. Owen, supra note 5, at 1265; Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 60
MARQ. L. REV. 753 (1977); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 237 (1965).
54. Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished? - A Statement for the Af-
firmative, ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW, 1965
PROCEEDINGS at 282; Snyman, supra note 35, at 407. Contra, Note, 44 HARv. L. REv.
1173, which argues that the compensation concept has become so ingrained that we
have forgotten that every tort award serves to punish and admonish the defendant.
This position is also supported in Owen, supra note 5, at 1278.
55. Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished? - A Statement for the Af-
firmative, ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW, 1965
PROCEEDINGS at 282; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d at 706-07, 60
Cal. Rptr. at 417-18.
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dard for awarding such damages is vague and unclear.5 6
In short, the constitutional attacks have centered around
the fact that punitive damages for tortious conduct represent
the only area of law in America where one can be punished
and deprived of one's property without clear guidelines or evi-
dentiary safeguards of due process well known in all other
forms of legal punishment.
5 7
The Toole case rejected the constitutional attack based
upon the denial of criminal defense rights. Citing United
States v. Regan,5 the court stated that civil rules of evidence
and procedure, not criminal rules, were applicable in civil ac-
tions to recover a penalty for a public offense.5 9 The Regan
case involved a federal statute which made the subsidizing of
transportation costs of any immigrant contract laborer (with
specified exceptions) into the United States a misdemeanor
and imposed a $1,000 penalty upon a violator. Although the
district court and the court of appeals ruled that the reasona-
ble doubt burden of proof was required for conviction, the Su-
preme Court held that Congress intended this public offense
statute to be enforced as a civil action and it was well settled
that Congress possessed such power. The Court continued:
And while in a strictly criminal prosecution the jury may not
return a verdict against the defendant unless the evidence
establishes his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in civil ac-
tions it is the duty of the jury to resolve the issues of fact
according to a reasonable preponderance of the evidence,
and this although they may involve a penalized or criminal
act. 0
The 1914 Regan case involved a federal statute which im-
posed a fine of a specified amount rather than the common
law remedy of punitive damages. By analogy, its rationale
could probably be applied to common law punitive damages.
However, in light of the basic differences between statutory
56. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979), reh., 615 P.2d 621
(Alaska 1980).
57. See Haskell, Punitive Damages: Expanded Application Creates Problems,
NAT'L LAW J. 25 (1978). The above idea is reiterated in Justice Coffey's dissent in
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
58. 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
59. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 706-07, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18.
60. 232 U.S. at 39.
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penalties and common law punitive damages as well as the
numerous advancements in the constitutional protection of in-
dividuals since 1914, it is questionable whether Regan could
be used as authority today.
Eight years after Toole, the Federal District Court of Ha-
waii faced and rejected a constitutional attack based on due
process and equal protection, in Vollert v. Summa Corp6 1
The Vollert case involved a strict liability cause of action and
a punitive damage claim. The plaintiff sought an order to
compel the defendant to answer the plaintiff's interrogatories
regarding the financial condition of the defendant corpora-
tion. The defendant objected on the grounds that a punitive
damage claim based on strict liability violated the defendant's
right to due process and equal protection. The district court
rejected this constitutional attack and ordered the defendant
to answer the plaintiff's interrogatories. The court's rationale
was based on the premise that although a punitive claim may
not be the most effective means of punishing reckless behav-
ior, this argument does not reach constitutional dimensions.
62
The court also noted that the court's ability to examine jury
awards would help to further protect the constitutional rights
of defendants.
The second type of constitutional attack, based on a void-
for-vagueness approach, was rejected in a 1979 case. The de-
fendant in Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day had argued that
Alaska's standard for punitive awards violated the defendant's
due process rights because it failed to provide clear standards
of culpability for the jury to consider, and it did not provide
fair warning to defendants as to what conduct would create
liability. 3 The court rejected this vagueness approach, citing
its previous adoption of section 908 of the Restatement (Sec-
61. 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975). Subsequent to Vollert, a Georgia district
court also rejected several constitutional objections to punitive damage claims. In
Daugherty v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 85 F.R.D. 693 (N.D. Ga. 1980), the de-
fendant brought a motion to dismiss a punitive damage claim on the grounds that
punitive damages unduly burden interstate commerce and subject the defendant to
cruel and unusual punishment. The district court summarily dismissed these objec-
tions, stating that they were without merit. Id. at 695.
62. The court in Vollert also noted that defendant had failed to provide the court
with citations to any case which held punitive damages violative of the Constitution.
389 F. Supp. at 1350.
63. 594 P.2d at 46.
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ond) of Torts as establishing an adequately clear standard of
conduct for awarding punitive damages. 4
Despite the refusal of the courts to recognize constitutional
defenses to punitive damage awards, there is great appeal to
the argument that a defendant should not be forced to suffer
the imposition of numerous punitive awards;65 clearly the de-
fendant then suffers financially to a degree well beyond any
penalty inflicted on the basis of a conviction under a criminal
statute. Under such circumstances, a conviction for violating a
criminal statute becomes important not because of the imme-
diate monetary penalty imposed, but because of the criminal
conviction's effect upon a later civil action."6 The situation
may not violate the letter of the Constitution's prohibition
against double jeopardy, but it comes close to violating the
64. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) provides as follows:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal dam-
ages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and
to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because
of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider
the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the
plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the
defendant.
65. Tozer, supra note 5, at 304:
But, although fairness was a force in framing the Constitution, the Consti-
tution is not necessarily the final or the all-inclusive embodiment of all that's
fair. Our argument, then, is too restricted when we rely on the Constitution
alone; we should be relying on the universally recognized but mostly subcon-
scious ideal of justice.
Justice requires that limits be placed on punishment; that one jury's mulct
should be enough; that the windfall of punitive damages designed originally to
punish once be limited to its original purpose. Justice requires that when soci-
ety has punished once by criminal sanctions, society should be content. It
should not demand or permit successive punishment by the device of punitive
damages.
66. An excellent example of this situation was the State of Indiana's prosecution
of Ford Motor Company under the state's reckless homicide statute for the deaths of
three women who burned to death after a rear-end collision in a Ford Pinto. The
criminal penalty of $30,000 was second in significance to the possible effect of a con-
viction on subsequent civil actions arising from the Ford Pinto. For this reason Ford
invested large sums of money in obtaining its acquittal of the charge. For discussion
of the reckless homicide trial, see articles in the Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1980, at 2, 20,
col.3; id., Jan. 16, 1980, at 23, col. 2; id., Jan. 29, 1980, at 39, col. 1; id., Feb. 6, 1980,
at 30, col. 1; id., Feb. 8, 1980, at 20, col. 2. See also Wheeler, In Pinto's Wake: Crimi-




The difficulty with the fairness argument is that it can ap-
peal to both sides of the issue. An unpublished Wisconsin
Court of Appeals decision noted that the strict liability con-
cept forces compensation by the innocent seller who has done
everything possible to perfect his product; therefore, more is
needed for the manufacturer. "It is therefore reasonable that
the seller who has been outrageously culpable ought to be de-
terred from such conduct by more than a duty to
compensate."'0 8
Professor David Owen partially justified the imposition of
such damages because "such flagrant breaches of the law ex-
posing others to risks of personal injury violate basic princi-
ples of fairness and morality." '89 Perhaps the issue should be
treated as one of fact: is the manufacturer's conduct such that
the equitable "clean hands" doctrine is not applicable?
2. Compensatory Damages as a Sufficient Deterrent
As previously discussed, punitive damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to manufacturers who may be tempted to
cut corners in product safety matters. According to one team
of authors, punitive damages are the only effective tool by
which society may exercise control over a manufacturer's
profit motive.70 Roginsky, on the other hand, rejected this
necessary deterrent justification, reasoning that the potential
for multiple and substantial compensatory awards was suffi-
67. Tozer, supra note 5, at 304. The defendant is also damaged by the resultant
publicity caused by personal injury or product liability actions based on a defect in
the product. See Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1978, at 48, col. 1, for an account of the Ford
Pinto's decrease in sales resulting from the adverse publicity concerning the vehicle's
defect.
68. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] PROD. LB. REP.
(CCH) 8497 at 18,415 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). The court of appeals decision was sub-
sequently reviewed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,
97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). The court of appeals decision is cited here as
an illustration of the equities supporting a punitive damage award. Because the court
of appeals decision was not published in the official Wisconsin Reporter series, it is
not citable a§ precedent in the State of Wisconsin. Wis. Stat. § 809.23(3) (1979).
69. Owen, supra note 5, at 1291. Owen also states that the use of punitive dam-
ages in civil and criminal law has provided a useful tool in the administration of
justice. Id. at 1278.
70. Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in the Products Case, 6 PEPPERDIm L.
REV. 139, 140 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Robinson & Kane].
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cient to deter manufacturers.7 1 Judge Friendly believed that
even if insurance coverage absorbed a manufacturer's liability,
the subsequent rise in the defendant's insurance rates and the
consequent loss of professional reputation would prevent any
manufacturer from engaging in conduct that would merit a
punitive award. 2 Obviously, a difference of opinion exists as
to the need for an additional deterrent device.
Those commentators who say that compensatory damages
alone are an insufficient deterrent point out that manufactur-
ers will seek to maximize profits by holding safety costs down;
any resultant consumer injuries may be reimbursed through
insurance and accounted for as a cost of doing business.73
Armed with the knowledge that few injured consumers will
identify the manufacturer's product as the cause of injury,
that of those consumers only a portion will sue, and that fewer
still will endure the entire litigation, the profit-motivated
manufacturer will opt for marketing the less-than-safe prod-
uct.7 4 Compensatory damages will not remove any portion of
this illicit profit since such expenses have already been ac-
counted for; only a punitive damage award, which cannot be
accounted for, will remove the illicit profit, thereby placing
the manufacturer in a worse position than before. 5
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., holding that compensatory dam-
ages were often insufficient to deter corporate defendants
from engaging in further wrongdoing:
Some [defendants] may think it cheaper to pay damages or
71. 378 F.2d at 841.
72. Id.
73. Robinson & Kane, supra note 70.
74. Id.
75. Id. Punitive damage award expenses cannot be accurately forecast because:
the method of measurement used for punitive damages introduces additional
imponderables that make it virtually impossible for a manufacturer to forecast
accurately its total liability for punitive damages. Thus, depending on such
factors as the gravity of wrongdoing, the number and/or seriousness of the re-
sulting injuries, and the financial status of the manufacturer, the punitive
damages assessments that might flow from wantonly marketing a defective
product could range from nothing to millions, or even hundreds of millions, of
dollars. Such a manufacturer will probably have a good idea of the potential
profitability of marketing the defective product but no idea of its potential
liability.
Owen, supra note 5, at 1285.
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a forfeiture than to change a business practice.... The
possibility of the manufacturer paying out more than com-
pensatory damages might very well deter those who would
consciously engage in wrongful practices and who would set
aside a certain amount of money to compensate the injured
consumer. Punishment of manufacturers guilty of inten-
tional or reckless breaches of their obligation by imposing
punitive damages might diminish the profitability of mis-
conduct and any unfair competitive advantages such manu-
facturers might otherwise have.76
The sufficiency of compensatory damages as a deterrent
was also attacked in a recent Minnesota Supreme Court
case.77 It was the Gryc court's belief that the potential for
compensatory damage awards simply had not worked as a de-
terrent to a manufacturer's misconduct: "[S]ince the potential
of compensatory damages awards and loss of sales and reputa-
tion did not serve to deter Riegel [the manufacturer] in the
past, Riegel cannot now argue that these considerations act as
an adequate deterrent.
'7 8
The court went on to hold that compensatory damages
were not adequate deterrents even where the manufacturer
had discontinued production of the product in issue. The
court reasoned that since the manufacturer had acted in reck-
less disregard of the public's safety for purely economic rea-
sons in the past, there was no guarantee that compensatory
damages would deter the manufacturer from acting similarly
in the future. Hence, a punitive damage award was needed to
deter the manufacturer from acting in a similar manner with
respect to other products manufactured by it in the future.79
The preceding logic, if its premises are accepted, is difficult
to refute. However, manufacturers cannot all be placed into
one category. They vary as to products, competition, type of
buyer, damages, etc. Thus, the logic of Wangen and Gryc may
76. 97 Wis. 2d at 285-86, 294 N.W.2d at 451 (footnote omitted).
77. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub
nom., Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980). Gryc involved a strict liabil-
ity claim against a manufacturer of cotton flannel used in the production of children's
sleepwear.
78. Id. at 741.
79. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning in Sturm, Ruger &
Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), holding that public policy dictated the use of
punitive damages in these situations.
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apply in the case of one manufacturer but not in that of an-
other. The very development of the strict liability concept oc-
curred as a means of allowing manufacturers to distribute un-
avoidable product defect compensatory costs throughout
society.80 Compensatory costs are presumed to be built into
the system. The growing number of product liability claims
proves that potential plaintiffs are becoming more aware of
their rights and possible court recoveries." These factors
mean that future compensatory awards should be increasing
in frequency and aggregate amount. The estimation and inclu-
sion of-their ever-increasing costs, even if limited to compen-
satory damages, should become more difficult for any
manufacturer.
Accepting the premise that a manufacturer possesses the
ability to estimate and include its future compensatory dam-
age costs as business expenses (thereby eliminating their de-
terrent effect), the allowance of punitive damages in such a
context means that a court of law has decided that a manufac-
turer exhibited reckless disregard of another's safety by ac-
cepting too many probable injuries as a wise business decision.
Because strict liability presumes the occurrence of some con-
sumer injuries, the imposition of punitive damages indicates
that the manufacturer accepted too much risk in exchange for
expected returns. Perhaps courts are ill equipped to make
such a decision, which involves a consideration of commercial
competition, the existent state of scientific and technical ex-
pertise, "public good" and consumer desires. As one law re-
view author wrote: "Using punitive damages to compel the
manufacturer to use the safest method of production poses to
courts problems which they may not be able to or should not
be allowed to settle. Courts will be forced to resolve the extent
to which businessmen should not take economic gambles.
'8 2
Despite the argument that the judiciary should not be in-
volved in commercial regulation policy decisions, most courts
80. See notes 168-71 and accompanying text, infra.
81. One indication of this increasing awareness and use of product liability law-
suits is the increase in insurance premium costs borne by manufacturers. In 1975,
manufacturers paid $1.3 billion in insurance premiums, but in 1978 the insurance
expense had risen to $2.75 billion. The Devils in the Product Liability Law, Bus.
WEEK, Feb. 12, 1979, at 72.
82. Note, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895, 910 (1975-76).
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have awarded punitive damages in product liability suits. The
deterrent effect is firmly accepted and common sense makes it
difficult to doubt that the possibility of a hefty punitive jury
verdict would deter a rational and reputable manufacturer.83
Punitive damage awards may act as deterrents by inducing
private persons to bring suit against guilty manufacturers. Al-
though pain and suffering and mental anguish are considered
in assessing compensatory damages,8 the actual costs of
bringing a strict liability suit (attorney's and expert's fees) are
extremely high and are still not included (except to a very
limited extent) in the computation of plaintiff's damages.8 5
Therefore, the opportunity to secure a punitive damage award
provides significant incentive for a plaintiff to begin the long
and expensive road to product litigation.
3. Cost Falls upon the Public
Perhaps Judge Friendly's most persuasive criticism of pu-
nitive damage awards in product liability cases was his fear
that the existence of multiple claims against a manufacturer
would drive a defendant into bankruptcy.88 This resultant de-
struction of the business entity would not only be unfair to
the manufacturer, but would ultimately cause harm to the
very consumers whom the concept of punitive damages was
designed to protect.17 Driving a firm out of business will elimi-
nate one competitor; with competition curtailed, the consum-
ers' range of choices may be limited and therefore remaining
competitors may lessen quality control or cease their efforts to
introduce new products.8 8
Also, the recovery of multiple punitive damage awards
against American businesses may result in higher product
costs which would magnify their disadvantage in competition
83. Owen, supra note 5, at 1285-86.
84. Tozer, supra note 5, at 303-04.
85. Owen, supra note 5, at 1297.
86. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 839-42. One writer notes
that Richardson-Merrell has been the defendant in at least 40 lawsuits each claiming
$500,000 in punitive damages for MER/29 in the Chicago area alone. Those figures
add up to $20,000,000. Tozer, supra note 5, at 301.
87. The consumer who recovers punitive damages is also the consumer who pays
higher product costs or who forces a company out of business. Ghiardi & Koehn,
supra note 35, at 251.
88. Note, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 895, 910-11 (1976).
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with foreign manufacturers." The inevitable result is that if
the punitive damage award did not bankrupt the manufac-
turer, the inability to compete with foreign products would.
Even if the consumer is not harmed by the lack of compe-
tition between businesses, he will pick up the cost of punitive
awards as a taxpayer. The public will pay for the hidden costs
of bankruptcy through higher taxes for increased welfare, re-
training and unemployment programs occasioned by business
failures. 90 In essence, the American taxpayer would ulti-
mately bear the expense occasioned by imposition of multiple
punitive damage awards. Moreover, imposition of punitive
costs could have an adverse effect not only to the manufac-
turer, but on those commercial businesses which supply
materials for use in the production of the product in issue.91 If
the manufacturer of the defective product goes bankrupt, the
supplier must either find a new market for its component part
or curtail production of that product. Hence, punitive dam-
ages will have become counterproductive.
92
Maxey v. Freightliner Corp." best describes the circum-
stances which create this potential for a series of punitive
awards causing the destruction of the defendant enterprise.
Acknowledging that proof of liability by a single plaintiff in a
product design case indicts all products of that design, the
court pointed out that a product manufacturer will feel the
immediate pinch of multiple exposure. Although each jury in
a product case will faithfully follow the applicable legal prin-
ciples, "it is the aggregate effect of several juries' faithful ad-
herence to the law that poses risk of ultimate destruction."'"





93. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623
F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 962. It is interesting that not only do most juries follow their legal in-
structions, but they also exhibit an insightful sense of fair play. The jury in Sturm,
Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), awarded $2,895,000 in punitive dam-
ages, after the evidence at trial had shown the defendant to have made $1.93 profit on
each defective gun it manufactured. Apparently, the jury multiplied this "illicit"
profit figure by the number of such guns produced - 1.5 million - to reach the
$2,895,000 exemplary award. Professor Owen would applaud this "profit removal" by
the jury, but it is Judge Higginbotham's point in Maxey that this basic "fair play" by
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Punitive damages represent the vindication of society's
rights against the defendant. In a single case the private inter-
ests of the individual plaintiff and the interests of society are
parallel; after the first award in a products case, however, the
parallelism of interest is lost. Judge Higgenbotham cautioned
in Maxey that "we ought not in our quest for public safety
lose sight of the obvious - with no products, there are no
consumers."
95
The desire to avoid bankrupting a defendant expressed in
Roginsky and Maxey has generally been accepted by scholars
and courts.98 However, most have upheld punitive awards
anyway, reasoning that judicial controls on the granting of ex-
cessive punitive awards obviate the risk of the manufacturer's
destruction, or that the particular case at bar had not made
a sufficient showing of the likelihood of such destruction."
Some courts have simply rejected the argument.99 It appears
that the fear of the manufacturer's destruction has not yet
caused a court to dismiss a punitive damage claim, but the
argument has forced scholars and courts to examine the
each single jury will produce a cumulative effect that is unfair and harmful. Owen,
supra note 5, at 1316; 594 P.2d at 48 (Burke, J., dissenting). In Palmer v. A.H. Robins
Co., 22 ATLA L. REP. 349 (Colo. 1980), the jury evaluated the financial status of
Robins, and in effect based its punitive award on all the profits Robins received from
sales of the Dalkan Shield during life of the product.
95. 450 F. Supp. at 962 (emphasis in original).
96. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 5, at 1320, Tozer, supra note 5, at 301; Ghiardi &
Koehn, supra note 35, at 251; Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1350-51 (D.
Hawaii 1975).
97. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 298-308, 294 N.W.2d at 457-61.
98. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. at 1351. The court expressly stated that
Roginsky was not applicable to the case at bar because there were no other suits filed
against the defendant. The court's ruling combined with the discussion in § IV-C-4,
infra, clearly shows that defense counsel must offer proof of other pending suits to
the trial judge for his consideration.
99. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. at 962-63. Rinker v. Ford Motor
Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) simply stated that public policy argu-
ments could be dealt with as they arose:
However, given the purpose of punitive damages to punish a defendant for an
aggravated act of misconduct and to deter similar conduct in the future by the
defendant and others, there is no fundamental reason for excluding products
liability cases from the cases in which punitive damages may be recovered.
In Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 22 ATLA L. REP. 349 (Colo. 1980), the court rejected
the argument that the verdict should be set aside to arrest the multiplier effect of
similar verdicts. The court reasoned that this was the first large verdict and suggested
that the remedy should lie with succeeding verdicts.
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means by which courts may control the amount of such
awards.
A second strand of the public harm argument against pu-
nitive damages urges that even if a business entity is not
bankrupted, the consumers will still suffer because the manu-
facturer will recoup his punitive losses by raising the price
that consumers must pay.10 In Wangen, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court handled the "cost-passing" argument by point-
ing out that manufacturers are not always able to pass on to
their customers all costs, including multiple punitive damage
awards. 011 The court, in refuting Ford's argument on "cost-
passing," quoted a Wisconsin circuit court decision on that
subject:
"Finally, Ford argues that even if punitive damages
were awarded against it, it would not be punished because it
would merely pass on the cost of doing business. That argu-
ment flies in the face of all the statements in Ford's annual
reports and quarterly statements regarding competitive pric-
ing. It does not follow .. .that a punitive damage award
will be passed on in whole or in part as a cost of doing busi-
ness. It may or may not, depending upon Ford's price stand-
ing in relation to its competitors and its own financial condi-
tion. It could mean lower profits for Ford. It could result in
stockholder complaints about a lower profit margin because
of punitive damage awards for unsafe cars, thereby spurring
Ford on to exercise more care in the safe design of its
automobiles. It could result in a greater scrutiny by Ford's
management of its auto design from the safety standpoint.
All of these changes, with the exception of lower profits or
higher costs, if they were to take place, would benefit the
public as a whole."'0 2
100. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 851; Ghiardi &
Koehn, supra note 35, at 251.
101. 97 Wis. 2d at 287-88, 294 N.W.2d at 452.
102. Id. at 288, 294 N.W.2d at 452 (quoting Barager v. Ford Motor Co., No. 76-
CV-215 (Eau Claire County Cir. Ct., Wis., Sept. 15, 1977)). The Wisconsin Court of
Appeals in its unpublished decision in Wangen also addressed the cost-passing
argument-
The extent to which a seller may pass on costs is a matter for economists to
debate and no doubt depends upon a host of factors. Surely the seller who does
not experience punitive damage awards is in a better position to compete than
sellers with those high costs. Everyday observations tell us that this is a buy-
ers' as well as a sellers' world and that the seller who thinks he can pass on all
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The court's point is insightful and would probably hold
true in a tightly competitive market. But not all manufactur-
ers operate in a pluralistic market like Ford Motor Company
does. If a defendant-manufacturer holds a monopolistic posi-
tion in an inelastic market, there is little price restraint affect-
ing the manufacturer's decisions. The court's position is also
undermined by increasing concentration in the nation's eco-
nomic system, which has spurred the growth of conglomerates
and multiple business ownership within parent companies. 03
The organizational vastness of many of today's economic enti-
ties enables costs to be spread between corporate divisions. A
business loss by one wholly owned subsidiary may even be
welcomed as a tax-reducing mechanism by the parent
corporation.
Of course, the preceding circumstances and options are not
at issue for numerous manufacturers. Many manufacturers are
less involved in the mass distribution of products and do not
face as great an exposure to vast numbers of plaintiffs. It
would appear that the economic entities most likely to face
great punitive damage exposure are also the entities best
equipped to "pass on" such costs or utilize such damages to
their own interest. At any rate, the question of whether the
penalty of punitive damages is ultimately passed to the public
is a complex economic business question which the courts may
not be fully equipped to handle.
4. No Practical Way to Cut Off Liability
As indicated in the preceding section, courts must be con-
cerned with the potential for aggregate punitive damage
awards against a defendant-manufacturer, lest the cumulative
effect of such multiple awards drive a socially desirable enter-
prise into oblivion. The basic problem facing today's courts is
how to fairly administer large claims for punitive damages in
multiple product liability cases to avoid ruinous results to the
defendant while still deterring the defendant from outrageous
costs may lose his market.
[1978-1979 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 8497 at 18,416-17.
103. Recent trends in corporate mergers and interbusiness buying are discussed in
The Biggest Buying Spree Since the Sixties, FORTUNE, May 7, 1979, at 306 and The
Merger Boom Breeds More Inside Trading, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 5, 1979, at 79.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
conduct.'0
Judge Friendly believed that there was no practical way to
cut off the potential liability of manufacturers. 10 5 Other courts
have recognized the bankruptcy danger facing mass producers
of a defective product, but have refrained from addressing the
issue until such a situation was actually present in a justifia-
ble case.1°8 The Wangen court, on the other hand, was per-
suaded that existing judicial control over the award of puni-
tive damages would be sufficient to avoid the destruction of a
manufacturer:
We are persuaded that the problems Ford raises as to
punitive damages, especially the problem of controlling mul-
tiple awards, can be minimized in this state in the litigation
process. We are persuaded that punitive damages may play
a vital role in product liability cases and that the role must
be shaped, as is the role of all damage awards, to fit the con-
text in which the particular case arises. Judicial controls ex-
ist in this state for determining whether the imposition of
punitive damages is appropriate- in the particular case and
for determining the amount of the punitive damages award
which will serve the punishment and deterrent objectives of
punitive damages, without inflicting a penalty on a defen-
dant disproportionate to the defendant's wrong and contrary
to the public interest.107
The Wisconsin court went on to enumerate the various
controls on the litigation process, which when taken in the ag-
gregate would be sufficient to control the effects of multiple
punitive damage awards. First of all, the court considered the
role of the trial judge in submitting the issue of punitive dam-
ages to the jury. The court observed that the trial judge in
Wisconsin initially determines whether the evidence estab-
lishes a proper case for punitive damages and for submission
of the issue to the jury. 0 8 In order for the issue to be submit-
ted to the jury, the trial judge must find that there is evidence
104. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 839.
105. Id. at 840.
106. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. at 1351; Rinker v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 567 S.W.2d at 668-69; Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 22 ATLA L. RP. 349
(Colo. 1980).
107. 97 Wis. 2d at 297-98, 294 N.W.2d at 457.
108. Id. at 298, 294 N.W.2d at 457.
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in the record which would allow a jury to find that the wrong-
doer's conduct was "outrageous." If no such evidence is found,
then the trial judge is required to refuse to submit the issue of
punitive damages to the jury.109 The court concluded that this
type of restraint would help to eliminate cases which have
emotional appeal for punishment but no basis in fact.
Secondly, the Wisconsin court was concerned with the de-
gree of certitude the trier of fact must have in order to find
that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's
rights. The court concluded that the issue of whether the de-
fendant acted "outrageously" requires a relatively high bur-
den of proof because "outrageous" conduct falls within a cer-
tain class of acts for which a stigma occurs.110 The court went
on to adopt a middle burden of proof in which the plaintiff
must prove to a reasonable certainty by evidence that is clear,
satisfactory and convincing that the defendant acted with
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights."' This burden of
proof requires a greater degree of certitude than that required
in ordinary civil cases, but a lesser degree than that required
to convict in a criminal case. 1 2 Essentially, the court was con-
vinced that a higher burden of proof would help to eradicate
any marginal allegations of punitive damages. It should be
noted that this middle burden of proof has not been adopted
by many other courts.
Thirdly, the court concluded that even if the jury were sat-
isfied to a reasonable certainty that there was clear, satisfac-
tory and convincing evidence that the defendant's conduct
was "outrageous," in Wisconsin the jury need not award puni-
tive damages.11 3 The assessment of punitive damages lies
solely in the discretion of the jury, and therefore the plaintiff
is not entitled to a punitive award as a matter of right. The
effect of such a rule is that the jury's refusal to award punitive
damages is not reviewable even though the evidence supports
such an award.
Fourthly, the court stated that the danger of excessive pu-
nitive damages may be effectively mitigated by allowing the
109. Id.
110. Id. at 298-99, 294 N.W.2d at 457-58.
111. Id. at 299, 294 N.W.2d at 457-58.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 301, 294 N.W.2d at 458.
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jury to consider the "wealth of the defendant which would in-
clude consideration of compensatory damages and fines and
forfeitures already imposed on the defendant or likely to be
imposed. ' 114 It was the court's belief that a jury could more
reasonably and equitably measure punitive damages if it
could consider factors which are significant to determining the
deterrent and punitive objectives of punitive damages. More-
over, a jury would be less likely to award a large punitive
damage claim if it knew that the defendant had already been
punished through previous punitive awards.
11 5
Finally, the court saw an additional control over punitive
damage awards in the fact that determination of the award is
not left solely to the discretion of the jury. In Wisconsin, the
judge has control over excessive punitive awards. Both the
trial court and the appellate court have the power to reduce
the amount of a punitive damage award to an amount which
is fair and reasonable and to grant the plaintiff the option of
accepting the sum or having a new trial."' This type of judi-
cial control would serve as a final safeguard to a defendant
who has already suffered the imposition of other punitive
awards.
The Wangen court apparently proposes the limitation of
prospective punitive awards through the use of judicial con-
trols in order to prevent a business entity from being unduly
crippled. Roginsky rejected this approach as being unfair to
plaintiffs who commenced litigation after large punitive
awards had been given,17 but the Wangen court reasoned
that the basic question was not whether some injured plaintiff
made a profit but whether punitive damages would effectively
114. Id. at 304, 294 N.W.2d at 459-60. This was also proposed in Daugherty v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 85 F.R.D. 693 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
115. 97 Wis. 2d at 305, 294 N.W.2d at 460. Justice Coffey in his dissent in
Wangen disagreed with the effectiveness of introducing evidence concerning prior pu-
nitive awards. It was his belief that any such evidence would have a prejudicial and
inflammatory effect upon the jury. Instead, Justice Coffey proposed a bifurcated trial,
one on the issue of compensatory damages and the other on punitive damages. Id. at
322-23, 294 N.W.2d at 468.
116. Id. at 306-07, 294 N.W.2d at 461. This concept is based on the "Powers rule"
first formulated in Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960).
Under the tenets of that rule the trial court has the power to raise or lower compen-
satory damages and give the plaintiff or defendant the option of a new trial. Id.
117. 378 F.2d at 840.
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punish and deter, objectives which are in the public inter-
est." ' In light of the public interest promoted by punitive
damage awards, there is nothing wrong with removing this
"windfall" from subsequent plaintiffs. 1 9
The preceding approach was adopted by a Commerce De-
partment Task Force in drafting a proposed Uniform Product
Liability Act.120 The model act contains seven factors which
should be considered in determining the amount of a punitive
damage award. The seventh factor is:
The total effect of other punishment imposed or likely to be
imposed upon the product seller as a result of the miscon-
duct, including punitive damage awards to persons similarly
situated to the claimant and the severity of criminal penal-
ties to which the product seller has been or may be sub-
jected .... 121
118. 97 Wis. 2d at 292-93, 294 N.W.2d at 454.
119. This reasoning is also supported in Robinson & Kane, supra note 70, at 144,
where it is pointed out that the early plaintiffs in product liability litigation deserve
higher awards because they initiated litigation, paving the way for later plaintiffs and
making subsequent recoveries easier. See also Owen, supra note 5, at 1320-25.
120. Draft Uniform Product Liability Act (U.P.L.A.), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Model Act].
121. Id. § 120(B)(7). The complete section concerning punitive damages is as
follows:
(A) Punitive damages may be awarded to the claimant if the claimant
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result
of the product seller's reckless disregard for the safety of product users, con-
sumers, or others who might be harmed by the product.
(B) If the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be
awarded, the court shall determine the amount of those damages. In making
this determination, the court shall consider:
(1) The likelihood at the relevant time that serious harm would
arise from the product seller's misconduct;
(2) The degree of the product seller's awareness of that likelihood;
(3) The profitability of the misconduct to the product seller;
(4) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it by
the product seller;
(5) The attitude and conduct of the product seller upon discovery
of the misconduct and whether the conduct has been terminated;
(6) The financial condition of the -product seller;
(7) The total effect of other punishment imposed or likely to be
imposed upon the product seller as a result of the misconduct, including
punitive damage awards to persons similarly situated to the claimant
and the severity of criminal penalties to which the product seller has
been or may be subjected; and
(8) Whether the harm suffered by the claimant was also the result
of the claimant's own reckless disregard for personal safety.
1981]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Of course, using prior punitive damage awards to limit an
exemplary award in a particular case may prejudice the jury's
decision concerning the threshold punitive damage liability is-
sue.122 The proposed uniform act negates this possibility by
allowing the court to determine the amount of those damages
after the jury makes an exemplary award.123 In this way the
defendant may freely introduce evidence of prior punitive
awards in a separate, post-verdict hearing before the judge;
the jury's deliberations will remain untouched by such preju-
dicial information.
The proposed uniform act also seeks to protect defendant
manufacturers by requiring "clear and convincing" evidence
that the defendant's conduct exhibited "reckless disregard for
the safety of product users," in order to justify the imposition
of punitive damages. 124 This higher standard of proof was pro-
posed by the Task Force because punitive damages act as a
criminal penalty imposed in a civil suit devoid of any consti-
tutional protections for the defendant.
One commentator has criticized the model act's "reckless
disregard" standard. Although conceding that the act's "clear
and convincing" standard increases the quantum of evidence
required of the plaintiff, Attorney John Fulton argues that
such standard is confused by the "reckless disregard" lan-
guage. He believes the model act's language is too easily con-
fused with inadvertent conduct. 125 The Task Force's analysis
of this language, however, indicates that a defendant is not to
be held punitively liable under "ordinary strict liability or
negligence standards." 2 '
Courts have employed other safeguards to protect defen-
dant manufacturers from devastating multiple punitive dam-
Model Act, supra note 120, at § 120.
122. See 97 Wis. 2d at 326, 294 N.W.2d at 470 for Justice Coffey's criticism of the
introduction into evidence of prior awards of punitive damages in his dissent in
Wangen.
123. Model Act, supra note 120, at § 120(B). Owen, supra note 5, at 1320 agrees
with this position.
124. Model Act, supra note 120, at § 120(A). See Twerski & Weinstein, A Cri-
tique of the Uniform Product Liability Law - A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L.
REv. 221, 315 (1978-79), which analyzes an earlier version of the ultimate Model Act
draft.
125. Fulton, supra note 5, at 124-25.
126. Model Act, supra note 120, analysis of § 120(A).
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age awards. Noting that courts must be on guard against po-
tential bankruptcies, the court in Sturm, Ruger rejected the
plaintiff's arguments that the jury should assess punitive
damages in light of all wrongs committed against all purchas-
ers by the defendant; punitive damages are to be assessed
only for the wrong done to this particular purchaser. As a re-
sult, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial court's fail-
ure to reduce a $2,895,000 punitive award to $250,000. 127 It
would appear to be absolutely necessary that punitive dam-
ages in each case be assessed only in light of the wrong to the
plaintiff at bar; to consider a mass producer's wrongs against
all of the consuming public would clearly produce devastating
punitive awards.
The court in Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc.128 took an ex-
tremely unusual approach to punitive damage assessment.
The federal district court forbade the introduction of any evi-
dence of the defendant's net worth, reasoning that the exis-
tence of multiple suits obviated the need for evidence of
wealth in order to determine just punishment.1 29 The court
stated that only one-on-one torts, for which punitive damages
first developed, required evidence of the defendant's
wealth.130 This finding clearly represents a minority view-
point, for evidence as to a defendant's wealth has been consid-
ered necessary to adequately assess a just punishment in the
form of punitive damages.131
The Hoffman position is not logically consistent. Even
with the potential for multiple awards in a product case, there
is no indication as to the effective "sting" of these awards, in-
dividually or in toto, without evidence as to the defendant's
financial position. Without such evidence, the punitive assess-
ment may even reach the point of bankrupting the defendant.
127. 594 P.2d at 48. The court stated: "The jurors apparently responded to an
invitation to punish Sturm, Ruger for all wrongs committed against all purchasers
and users of its products, rather than for the wrong done to this particular plaintiff."
Id.
128. 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974). The same ruling was made in Hoffman as
in Sturm, Ruger & Co. See note 127 supra.
129. 374 F. Supp. at 856-57.
130. Id.
131. See Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971); Ghiardi, Puni-




Defendants, perhaps even more than plaintiffs in some in-
stances, should seek to have evidence of wealth introduced.
The proposed model act retains evidence of defendant's
wealth as a relevant consideration in exemplary damages
assessment.132
Another means of controlling the amount of punitive dam-
ages awarded would be to consolidate all pending actions
against a manufacturer into one litigation. The United States
Judicial Conference can order such a consolidation when mul-
tiple injuries arise from a common basis, but such an attempt
in the MER/29 litigation was not successful because many of
the MER/29 cases were in state courts." 3 If, however, the fed-
eral courts make it a regular practice to consolidate such ac-
tions, wary defendants may seek, whenever possible, to re-
move themselves from state to federal court pursuant to
section 1441(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Certainly the nature of the mass disaster litigation may
create potential diversity jurisdiction for federal courts.
The reasonable limitation of a defendant's liability for pu-
nitive damages is possible. Despite Judge Friendly's doubts,
concepts such as court-determined damage amounts, consider-
ation of past punitive awards, separate hearings for the puni-
tive damages issue and legislation involving a comprehensive
trial consolidation procedure could provide a workable scheme
for softening the effect of punitive damage awards. In addi-
tion, the frequency of mass disaster litigation cases must be
kept in mind. MER/29 litigation has run its course with Rich-
ardson-Merrell avoiding an excessive number of punitive
damage awards:
While some 1500 claims were filed against the manufacturer
in that case, only eleven were tried to a jury verdict. Out of
these, only seven were decided for the plaintiff, and only
three of these included awards of punitive damages, one of
which was reversed on appeal. No doubt many claims were
settled out of court. Yet if this is an example of the most
crushing punishment that will befall a manufacturer guilty
of flagrant marketing behavior - and it is difficult to imag-
132. Model Act, supra note 120, at § 120(B)(6).




ine a more extreme case of such misbehavior than that of
Richardson-Merrell in marketing MER/29 - then the
threat of bankrupting a manufacturer with punitive dam-
ages awards in mass disaster litigation appears to be more
theoretical than real.'3 '
5. Inequitable to Punish Innocent Shareholders
Another criticism regarding the imposition of punitive
damages expressed in Roginsky was that punishing a corpo-
rate defendant involves punishing its stockholders, persons
who had nothing to do with the wrong perpetrated by the
guilty employee. 13 5 Today's business is overwhelmingly con-
ducted by entities operating in corporate form and conse-
quently the de facto shareholder bears the brunt of the pun-
ishment burden. This business reality would seem to remove
the punitive damage award's effectiveness in achieving its
punishment/deterrence goal.
Some jurisdictions attempt to lessen this apparent harsh-
ness by following what has been termed the "complicity rule"
of corporate liability.13 6 The complicity rule states that a cor-
poration can be assessed punitive damages only when the evi-
dence shows that the highest corporate officers ordered, par-
ticipated in, consented to or otherwise ratified the alleged
misconduct. 37 In this way, these jurisdictions have attempted
to impose punitive liability only when the alleged misconduct
is so close to the shareholder level that they should accept re-
sponsibility for employing unfit persons in positions of sub-
stantial responsibility.'33
The complicity rule is codified in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency and in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,"'9
134. Owen, supra note 5, at 1324-25.
135. 378 F.2d at 841.
136. See Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Straka, 47 Wis. 2d 739, 178 N.W.2d 28
(1970).
137. Owen, supra note 5, at 1300-01.
138. Id.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 909 (1979). The language of the two sections is almost identical. The RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states:
§ 909. Punitive Damages Against a Principal
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the
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but it has been adopted by only a minority of states.140 The
majority rule appears to be the "vicarious liability" rule,
which places liability for punitive damages on a corporation
for acts performed by any employee acting within the scope of
his employment. 141 This rule obviously shows no concern for
innocent shareholders. Professor Owen argues that the corpo-
rate shareholder, though morally blameless, is not quite so in-
nocent as to justify the elimination of punitive damages.1
42
Corporations cut safety corners in order to maximize profits
and thus satisfy demands of shareholders.1 3 Therefore, the
author reasons, the immediate profit-draining effect of puni-
tive damage awards is appropriate; the corporate treasury
should be stripped of these illicit profits.'4 Punitive damages
also provide corporate shareholders with the motivation to se-
lect competent and trustworthy officers; otherwise, sharehold-
ers might not take any initiative at all in overseeing corporate
management.
45
1 In light of the preceding considerations, it is surprising
that only one court has explicitly dealt with Roginsky's inno-
cent shareholder argument. Justice Abrahamson in Wangen
rejected this argument, stating that the loss of investment and
the decline in value of investments are risks which investors
assume. Moreover, a shareholder should not enjoy "ill-gotten"
gains which are the product of outrageous conduct on the part
of corporate management. Justice Abrahamson also pointed
out that the imposition of punitive damages serves a public
interest in encouraging shareholders to exercise closer control
over corporate operations:
manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was
reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in
the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or ap-
proved the act.
140. Owen, supra note 5, at 1301.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1304-05.
143. One article describing this pressure to perform and its effect in compelling
corporate personnel to take illegal and/or unethical shortcuts is contained in the Wall
St. J., Nov. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
144. Owen, supra note 5, at 1301.
145. Robinson & Kane, supra note 70, at 143-44.
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But the loss of investment and the decline in value of in-
vestments are risks which investors knowingly undertake,
and investors should not enjoy ill-gotten gains. There is a
public interest in encouraging shareholders and corporate
management to exercise closer control over the operations of
the entity, and the imposition of punitive damages may
serve this interest.
14 6
6. Insurance Coverage Removes Punitive/Deterrent Effect
Given the twin purposes of punishment and deterrence as
the basis for punitive damages, it becomes readily apparent
that any avoidance of an exemplary award's financial burden
by the defendant would destroy the effectiveness of such an
award. Insurance policies function so as to remove a financial
burden from the insured's shoulders. Obviously, insurance
coverage extending to.punitive damage awards nullifies the
award's punitive/deterrent effect, thereby calling into ques-
tion the need for the punitive concept. Judge Friendly noted
the problem in Roginsky,147 as have other commentators.
148 If
all exemplary losses by a manufacturer are covered by insur-
ance proceeds, then it is not the manufacturer, but rather the
consuming public (through higher insurance premiums) which
has been punished.
149
146. 97 Wis. 2d at 291, 294 N.W.2d at 453-54. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in
its unpublished decision in Wangen also addressed the innocent shareholder
agreement:
If punitive damages cannot be passed to the consuming public, then not only
shareholders, but also employees and creditors may be injured. As shareholders
may include pension and profit sharing plan trustees, mutual funds and other
large investors who in turn are owned by many shareholders, the ripple effect
of multiple punitive damage awards can be widespread.
[1978-79 Transfer Binder] PROD. LAB. REP. (CCH) 8497 at 18,416.
147. 378 F.2d at 841.
148. See, e.g., Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 35, at 250 (citing Tedesco v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, _, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941)):
A policy which permitted an insured to recover from the insurer fines imposed
for violation of a criminal law would certainly be against public policy. The
same would be true of a policy which expressly covered an obligation of the
insured to pay a sum of money in no way representing injuries or losses suf-
fered by a plaintiff but imposed as a penalty because of a public wrong.
149. Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 35, at 251. In Snyman, supra note 35, at 405, it
is stated:
Considering the extent to which the public is insured in today's commercial
world, the burden of the penalty would ultimately come to rest on the public
and not on the insurance companies as they would be passing the burden along
19811
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For the preceding reason, various scholars have argued
that insurance coverage for punitive damages should be pro-
hibited as a matter of public policy. P.C.A. Snyman summa-
rizes the argument against allowing insurance coverage:
If the insured is permitted to shift his penal burden to an
insurance company, punitive damages would then clearly
serve no useful purpose. Punitive damages do not compen-
sate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages
will already have been awarded to plaintiff. There is, of
course, no point in punishing the insurance company as it
has not wronged the plaintiff or society.150
Professor Owen, citing a study performed for the National
Commission on Product Safety,151 indicates that insurance
coverage does indeed impede deterrence in the product liabil-
ity area."" He argues that the deterrence goal of punitive
damages should be held paramount over an insured's contract
expectations, especially in the product liability field, for three
basic reasons:
1. A rule prohibiting insurance coverage of punitive dam-
ages is more likely to deter potential misconduct of profit-
minded manufacturers than of intoxicated drivers, a type of
defendant traditionally held liable for an exemplary award.
2. A business enterprise which wantonly endangers
thousands of lives will often be beyond the reach of the law.
3. The contract expectations of a manufacturer which
knowingly markets a defective product are not deserving of
protection.153
The three preceding reasons support the denial of insur-
ance coverage for punitive damage awards taken against man-
ufacturers. Unlike the traditional defendant for whom insur-
ance coverage of punitive awards has been upheld, the
manufacturer will view insurance as a means of avoiding legal
to the public in the form of increased premiums. Society would then, in fact,
be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured which surely must
be contrary to public policy.
150. Snyman, supra note 35, at 405.
151. Whitford, Products Liability, in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY,
3 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES - PRODUCT SAFETY LAW & ADMINISTRATION: FEDERAL,
STATE, LOCAL AND COMMON LAW 221, 223 (1970).
152. Owen, supra note 5, at 1308.
153. Id. at 1313.
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safety obligations. If insurance in fact removes the sting of
punitive awards, the whole purpose of exemplary damages is
frustrated.5 On the other hand, the defendant may be pun-
ished by an increase in rates, loss of business, etc.
In cases other than product liability cases, a split of au-
thority has developed over coverage of punitive damages.
Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty presents the
no-coverage side of the argument.1 55 Faced with a case involv-
ing a reckless driver, the court forbade the coverage of puni-
tive damages because such coverage would allow the defen-
dant to perform misconduct with impunity. The court stated
that there was no reason to punish the insurance company
and that such coverage would increase the premium burden
on the public.15
The contrary argument, stressing that an insured's reason-
able coverage expectations should be protected, was presented
in Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. 157 Also
faced with a reckless driver case, the Lazenby court ques-
tioned whether the prohibition of insurance coverage would
effectuate deterrence. The court also emphasized the fine line
between negligent conduct, for which policy coverage would
be available, and grossly negligent conduct, for which policy
coverage would not be available because a punitive award had
been made."5"
It appears that the Lazenby approach has been gaining
majority support,1 59 but its rationale has not yet been tested
in a strict liability situation. While it appears valid to ques-
tion whether a punitive damage threat will deter a drunken
reckless driver, the McNulty reasoning should prove stronger
154. Id. He also notes that denial of insurance coverage for punitive damages
would keep insurance costs down, an important consideration in a field where costs
are spiralling.
155. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). This landmark decision was authored by Judge
Wisdom.
156. Id. at 448. The decision is discussed in Owen, supra note 5, at 1310 and in
Burrell & Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L. Rav. 1, 13-16
(1978).
157. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
158. Id. The court stressed the inequity of providing a windfall for the insurer at
the expense of the policyholders' expectations. Id. at _, 383 S.W.2d 1 at 5.




in the case of a manufacturing defendant.
The rationale of the courts that allow a punitive damages
award in a products case will eventually run afoul of the rea-
soning that allows for the insurability of punitive awards. The
coverage argument is the same whether an automobile policy
or a products policy is involved. The public policy issue may
vary as Professor Owen suggests, but in all likelihood the
states that allow recovery will continue to do so in product
cases as well. 60
7. The Cost of Doing Business Should Not Include Punitive
Awards
Another attack upon the imposition of punitive damages
in strict liability cases stems from a close analysis of the un-
derlying principle upon which the imposition of strict liability
is based - that of societal redistribution of loss. Professor
Page Keeton summarizes the economic and practical consider-
ations underlying the creation of a strict liability standard for
product manufacturers:
The underlying economic propositions are that the maker
can pass on the costs resulting from the non-fault system to
the consuming public as a cost of doing business, and that in
so doing the resulting increased costs of products will not be
as harmful to the general welfare as has resulted from the
fixing of legal liability on a fault system, which would mean
that some losses shifted to the maker under non-fault sys-
tem would rest on the victims and some others would be
borne in part or entirely by others .... This necessarily
means that an equitable arrangement for the ultimate shift-
ing of losses to the consuming public at large is the goal
161
In other words, the development of strict liability represents a
social policy decision that the costs of the inevitable accidents
and injuries caused by today's economic and business system
should be passed on to the public through the vehicle of no-
fault liability and attendant higher product prices. Punitive
160. For a detailed discussion of the coverage and public policy issues, see J.
GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 7.11-.13 (1981). For a listing of the
cases, see appendices 7.29 and 7.30 in the same work.
161. Address by Page Keeton to Judicial Conference-Sixth Circuit, reported in 50
F.R.D. 319, 339-40 (May 21, 1970).
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damages, it is argued, are not appropriate in this context be-
cause they do not represent compensation for inevitable in-
jury; they represent deterrence of antisocial behavior. If such
damages are passed on to the public in the form of higher
product prices, the public is footing the bill for a penalty im-
posed for its very own protection.'62
The initial premise in the preceding analysis is solidly sup-
ported by case law and legal literature. Justice Traynor, the
author of the strict liability landmark case of Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.'6 3 capsulizes the development of
the no-fault liability concept, noting its concurrence with the
maturation of the industrial revolution.'6 As industrial soci-
ety took its first tentative steps, the legal system was reluc-
tant to stifle potential commercial development and thus a
protectionist attitude prevailed; lack of privity remained a
solid barrier to damages recovery from infant manufactur-
ers. 6 5 With the industrial revolution in its mature years, the
privity requirement was eliminated and injured parties sought
recovery by proving the negligence of the manufacturer., 6 As
the industrial and commercial systems reached a level of sta-
bility, the burden of injured parties was slowly lessened
through the use of res ipsa loquitur, implied warranty and
finally, strict liability.6 7 Strict liability represents the societal
decision that the economic system is strong enough to com-
pensate for the crippling side effects spawned by its processes
of production: "'The cost of injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person in-
jured, and a needless one, for the risk of the injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the pub-
lic as a cost of doing business.' "168
In other words, strict liability forces a seller to be its own
162. Snyman, supra note 35, at 406; Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 35, at 249.
163. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
164. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liabil-
ity, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
165. Id. at 363-65 (citing Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (1842)).
166. Id. (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 366 (quoting Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150
P.2d 436, 441 (1944)(Traynor, J., concurring)).
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insurer, with the premiums coming from all of its customer-
insureds. 16' The essential premise is that strict liability as-
sumes the existence of defective products and allows resul-
tant costs to be spread through society; 170 it passes on an inev-
itable by-product of the system.
As previously noted, this basic premise of the strict liabil-
ity approach is unchallenged. Detractors of the punitive dam-
age system argue that increased costs to cover exemplary
awards represent an unnecessary cost of the economic system.
Manufacturers are not required to engage in reckless conduct;
therefore their costs should be deterred by the criminal sys-
tem rather than the strict liability system.
The preceding argument, although plausible, is open to
several criticisms. First, penalties imposed on reckless manu-
facturers by criminal statutes can also be passed on to con-
sumers in the form of higher prices. Second, the imposition of
an exemplary award is contingent not upon the no-fault find-
ing of a defective product, but rather upon the finding of
some type of aggravated conduct by the manufacturer. There-
fore, the imposition of punitive damage awards has not been
completely incorporated into the social policy decision of no-
fault distribution of inevitable commercial costs and need not
be justified by reference to that policy's principles.
Finally, punitive damages, like strict liability, may be con-
sidered as part of a societal policy judgment. Strict liability is
premised upon the decision that all society will share the
financial burden of providing compensation to persons injured
by defective products; thereby society's members protect
themselvesY.
7
169. Note, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 895, 907 (1975-76): "In a manner of speaking,
strict liability forces the manufacturer to act as an insurer of his products, the cost of
which is spread among all consumers as a cost of the product."
170. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liabil-
ity, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
171. Owen, supra note 5, at 1292, stresses this danger: "The enormity of the dan-
ger to society posed by defective products would thus seem to require as a minimum




8. Alternative Systems Better Serve Goals of Punishment
and Deterrence
A final policy argument against punitive damages in pro-
duct liability cases is that punishment and deterrence, the
avowed goals of punitive damages, may be accomplished
through other less intrusive means, including enforcement of
existing criminal statutes. 172 State laws concerning deceptive
trade practices'" or state consumer regulations7 4 are tools
with which criminal penalties can be exacted from reckless
manufacturers. In addition, the federal Consumer Product
Safety Act 1 5 provides means whereby the public can be pro-
tected against reckless product sellers: (1) through the estab-
lishment of specific safety standards, and (2) through the im-
position of civil penalties of up to $500,000 per defective
product.176
Potentially a seller can be punished under four separate
theories: criminal, civil (punitive damages), pursuant to fed-
eral regulations (Consumer Product Safety Act) and pursuant
to state consumer protection regulations.177 Therefore, since
the means for punishing reckless and unscrupulous manufac-
turers and for deterring others from engaging in such conduct
already exist, there is no need to make punitive damages
available in product liability cases.178 Furthermore, there is a
potential here for multiple punishment which contravenes the
basic principles of justice in that once a defendant has been
punished by criminal sanctions, society should not be allowed
to exact more punishment.
179
The above reasoning is persuasive when applied to indus-
tries which are highly regulated by state and federal govern-
172. Fulton, supra note 5, at 132-34.
173. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 100 (1979), especially §§ 100.20 and 100.26.
174. See, e.g., Wis. ADnsN. CODE, chs. Ag. 109 to 127 (1981).
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976).
176. Justice Coffey in his dissent in Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 328-29, 294 N.W.2d at
471, stated his belief that the Consumer Product Safety Act and its state counter-
parts were sufficient deterrents to reckless conduct. Wisconsin Circuit Court Judge
John E. McCormick adopted the same view in a memorandum decision in 1979. Kles-
sig v. Boll, No. 453-106 (Milw. County Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 1979).
177. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 328, 294 N.W.2d at 471 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Tozer, supra note 5, at 304.
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ments. It breaks down when it is applied to manufacturers
which are not subject to the same intensive and extensive gov-
ernment regulations as other manufacturers.180 These less-reg-
ulated industries would not be deterred from engaging in
reckless conduct if there existed no civil or criminal penalty to
punish them. Hence, in the absence of government regulation,
a viable deterrent for a manufacturer would be the imposition
of a civil punitive damage award. Moreover, there exists a ba-
sic philosophical conflict between businesses in regard to
greater reliance on administrative controls in this area. While
some manufacturers may argue for pervasive administrative
regulations as a means to deter reckless conduct, other busi-
nesses claim that they are being overregulated and lobby for a
marketplace free of government control.181 In light of this dif-
ference, it would be difficult to establish a comprehensive set
of government regulations which would effectively deter all
kinds of manufacturers from engaging in reckless conduct.
Although these consumer laws and business regulation
codes do exist, there is really no hard data to support the po-
sition that these regulations are being vigorously pursued and
are adequate deterrents. 82 A vigorous prosecution of the con-
sumer laws is hampered by the very nature of product liability
litigation, which is ordinarily too expensive and complex to be
easily pursued by overworked district attorney or state attor-
ney general offices.183 Federal agencies are similarly handi-
capped. The length of the required litigation would place a
heavy drain on public coffers. In contrast, the current system,
by placing initial litigation costs upon the plaintiff, protects
the public treasury and ultimately places deterrent costs upon
consumers of the product, persons who really need and desire
that protection. The citizen who does not use the product is
not taxed for its "safety."
180. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 286, 294 N.W.2d at 451-52.
181. Id.
182. The Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out in Wangen that the introduction
of data involving the effectiveness of regulation would be more appropriate at the
trial level than the appellate level. This type of data would be relevant in attempting
to persuade the fact finder not to impose punitive damages or to bring in a smaller
award. Id. at 287, 294 N.W.2d at 452.
183. For example, the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office has only one
assistant district attorney working in its consumer fraud division.
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Anticipating these concerns, Attorney Fulton has sug-
gested that "private attorney general" statutes be enacted to
allow private, experienced attorneys to represent the state in,
seeking civil forfeitures from reckless manufacturers. Attorney
Fulton reasons that qualified attorneys would be attracted to
the litigation by the possibility of severe civil penalties and
substantial fees.
1 84
The key question in the foregoing proposal is whether
qualified attorneys will be attracted to the litigation. A dis-
tinction would have to be made between cases involving seri-
ous injuries and those involving only minor injuries. At any
rate, it would be necessary for any "private attorney general"
statute to provide the opportunity for substantial fees because
product cases meriting punitive damages would involve sub-
stantial time and money commitments by expert counsel.
The award of substantial attorney's fees would also add to
the proposed statute's deterrent effect. With the manufac-
turer forced to pay substantial civil forfeitures18 and heavy
attorney's fees, the financial desirability of reducing product
safety costs should be curtailed. The proposed statute would
remove the concern that multiple punitive awards would dev-
astate a manufacturer and also moot the issue of unfairness.
Of course, the cost of the punitive awards will still be
passed on to the public. The "private attorney general" stat-
ute will still allow product users to subsidize their own safety.
9. Conclusion
After a review of the policy arguments on each side of the
punitive damages issue, it is difficult to arrive at a definite
balance sheet total. It is clear that constitutional attacks upon
the punitive concept have fallen upon deaf ears and the fair-
ness question cuts both ways. Although liability for compensa-
tory damages alone is probably not a sufficient deterrent, it
also seems that courts may not be the proper forum to judge
the appropriateness of a commercial entity's acts. Eventually,
184. Fulton, supra note 5, at 133.
185. The civil forfeitures should be sufficient to cover the administrative costs of
the private attorney general system and provide a profit to the state. As an aside, the
most difficult administrative problem may be in the development of an attorney se-




the financial burden of punitive damages will fall upon soci-
ety's consumers, but perhaps only upon those who use the
product. It is not inequitable to punish "innocent" stockhold-
ers, but exemplary awards lose much of their effectiveness if
insurance coverage is present. There may be viable alterna-
tives to the present punitive damage system, but they are un-
tested in practical operation. The public policy question is an
exceedingly close call.
The closeness of the issue would be expected to have
caused a raft of court decisions, but that has not been the
case. The Roginsky side of the battle has been overwhelmed.
Vollert,186 Maxey,187 Wangen, 88 Sturm, Ruger,
189 Hoffman,190
Rinker,1 91 Gryc192 and American Laundry93 have all upheld
the submission of punitive damage claims to the jury in strict
liability cases. Only Walbrun v. Berkel and Granger v. Smeal
have dismissed such claims, and those dismissals were not on
public policy grounds.19 4 Why is there nearly unanimous ac-
ceptance of punitive damages in strict liability actions? The
answer probably lies more in physics than in law: allowance of
punitive damages has the weight of inertia on its side.
The use of punitive damages in most states' jurisprudence
has a long history. With a firm tradition behind the punitive
damages concept, courts are unwilling to strike down an ex-
emplary claim in the product liability area in the absence of a
clear and strong public policy position supporting such an
action. This section has already shown how close the punitive
damage policy issue is; such an uncertain situation does not
provide the justification most courts need to rule against years
of tradition. In three of the cases previously cited in this sec-
186. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975).
187. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623
F.2d 395 (1980).
188. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
189. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979).
190. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
191. Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1978).
192. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub
nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
193. American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 412 A.2d 407 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1980).
194. Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Granger v. Smeal
Mfg. Co., No. 76-CI.0200 (Wash. County Cir. Ct., Wis., Apr. 29, 1978).
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tion, the courts allowed punitive damage claims because state
law presented no contrary position.195 Justice Abrahamson in
Wangen explicitly stated that the rule of punitive damages as
a deterrent was firmly imbedded in Wisconsin law.196 She fur-
ther stated that the Wisconsin court could not, in good con-
science, prohibit punitive damages in all product liability
cases unless there was a strong showing that such prohibition
was in the public interest.1 9 7 Thus, it seems that only a strong
showing of public interest will prod a court into ruling in a
nontraditional fashion.
It appears that legislative action is the only means by
which punitive damages will be limited in the strict liability
area. 98 An enactment of the "private attorney general" stat-
ute would accomplish the objectives of exemplary awards and
remove many of the problems cited in Roginsky. It may even
be persuasive enough to allow courts in other jurisdictions to
reject the punitive damage concept in a call for similar legisla-
tive action.
D. Punitive Damages and Strict Liability: A Troubling
Inconsistency?
1. Punitive Damages Not a Separate Cause of Action
The imposition of punitive damages in a strict liability
case has been criticized as being legally inconsistent, both in
theory and in practical effect. In theory, a strict liability cause
of action relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving specific
acts of negligence and protects the plaintiff against certain de-
fenses of the manufacturer; a defendant's liability arises not
from any finding of fault, but rather from the finding that a
product is unreasonably defective. 9"
The purpose of punitive damages, on the other hand, is
195. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. at 1350; Maxey v. Freightliner Corp.,
450 F. Supp. at 961; Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d at 668.
196. 97 Wis. 2d at 278-79, 294 N.W.2d at 447-48.
197. Id.
198. Ironically, the best-known legislation thus far is the Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Act, supra note 120, which retains the current form of punitive damages with
some changes.
199. Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 35, at 247, citing Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d
443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). As one author has stated, "[t]he least important evidence
would be evidence of his [the manufacturer's] intention in making the product." To-
zer, supra note 5, at 301.
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punishment and deterrence; recovery is based on a finding of
aggravated fault and the conduct of the manufacturer is the
sole determinant of liability. In a case of strict liability in tort,
the conduct of the manufacturer is not at issue, and thus it is
singularly inappropriate to allow punitive damages where the
standards for awarding compensatory damages have been re-
laxed.20 0 Attorney Fulton picks up on this dichotomy between
the differing focuses of strict liability and punitive awards
when he emphasizes the practical litigation problems the un-
natural union creates. Not only must the pleadings contain
vastly different allegations to support each theory of recovery,
but the introduction at trial of evidence of a defendant's con-
duct may prejudice the jury's deliberations regarding the
strict liability compensatory award.0 1
Bifurcated trials or supplementary hearings should be re-
quired for the proof of a defendant manufacturer's aggravated
conduct, according to Fulton, while a final separate hearing
before the judge should be utilized to determine the amount
of punitive damages. 2  The adoption of such a procedure
forces the trial process to become more cluttered and
complex.
The first court to deal explicitly with the foregoing "incon-
sistency" argument was the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin. Drake v. Wham-O Manufac-
turing Co. involved a lawsuit based upon three designated
causes of action: negligence and strict liability in tort, breach
of implied warranty and wanton disregard for the safety and
well-being of the plaintiff's decedent. The ad damnum clause
requested punitive damages. 0 Judge Gordon noted that "the
third cause of action is a repetition of the first with the added
allegations of a wanton disregard for the safety and well-being
of the deceased. Clearly, it was designed to justify punitive
damages."204
The court stated that Wisconsin law required a showing of
200. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 322, 294 N.W.2d at 468 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting); Fulton, supra note 5, at 121-22.
201. Fulton, supra note 5, at 128-32.
202. Id. at 130; see also Justice Coffey's dissent in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97
Wis. 2d at 322-24, 294 N.W.2d at 468-69.
203. 373 F. Supp. 608, 609 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
204. Id. at 610.
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tortious conduct plus malice or wanton or reckless disregard
of personal rights to allow a punitive damage award." 5 Mere
negligence, even if of a gross nature, would not support a pu-
nitive damage award and therefore a strict liability claim
standing alone, representing a negligence per se finding, would
not support a punitive award.206 However, the court did hold
that a strict liability claim plus something more would allow a
punitive recovery:
Where the principal claim is based on strict liability in tort
and there is an additional claim of wanton disregard of the
plaintiff's rights, it is a simple matter to allow the plaintiff
to make a supplementary showing of aggravating conduct
for the purpose of proving entitlement to punitive dam-
ages.
207
Thus, the Drake court accepted the nonrecoverability of
punitive damages in cases in which only a defective product is
present. To justify a punitive award there must be some addi-
tional aggravated conduct. Judge Gordon ruled that proof of
this aggravated conduct would be allowed in a strict liability
case, despite the differing focus of the underlying strict liabil-
ity cause of action.
Perhaps the principal determinant in considering this ques-
tion is that a claim for punitive damages is considered a
prayer for a specific type of relief in Wisconsin, not a part of
the claim itself, and is therefore not demurrable.
However, I believe Wisconsin law clearly ties the availability
of punitive damages to the facts proved rather than the for-
205. Id. The court was correct in this interpretation of Wisconsin law. See
Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. RE v. 753 (1977).
206. 373 F. Supp. at 610, citing Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105
(1962). Bielski dropped the gross negligence legal concept and indicated that grossly
negligent conduct would not support a punitive damage award:
We recognize the abolition of gross negligence does away with the basis for
punitive damages in negligence cases. But punitive damages are given, not to
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, but to punish and deter the tortfeasor,
and were acquired by gross negligence as accountrements of intentional torts.
Willful and intentional torts, of course, still exist, but should not be confused
with negligence. The protection of the public from such conduct or from reck-
less, wanton, or willful conduct is best served by the criminal laws of the state.
16 Wis. 2d at 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113 (citation omitted).
207. 373 F. Supp. at 611.
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mal theory of recovery alleged.20 8
What Judge Gordon appears to be saying is that a punitive
damage claim represents neither a cause of action in and of
itself, nor a distinct part of a cause of action.20 9 Rather, he
views punitive damages as a type of relief which can be
awarded if the necessary facts are present to support such re-
lief. In other words, a punitive award may be compared to an
award for loss of future earning capacity or for past medical
services.210 If the plaintiff can prove such loss, he may recover
the compensatory amounts as part of his overall damage re-
covery. The recoverability of these losses is not limited to any
particular theory of legal liability, but depends only upon the
facts proved during the trial.
2. The Nature of a Punitive Damage Claim
Judge Gordon's reasoning in Drake clearly raises the con-
ceptual question of the nature of a punitive damage claim.
Does a punitive damage claim based upon aggravated conduct
constitute an entirely independent basis of recovery, or is it a
specific type of relief which "piggybacks" upon an underlying
cause of action?
Initially, a "cause of action" must be defined. In Wisconsin
the cause of action "is made up of the facts necessary to be
pleaded and proved in order to establish the defendant's lia-
208. Id. Judge Gordon cited Draeger v. John Lubotsky Motor Sales, 56 Wis. 2d
419, 202 N.W.2d 20 (1972) to support his assertion. The court in Draeger reversed a
trial court's dismissal of a punitive damage claim and stated that a prayer for relief is
not a substantive part of the complaint and thus cannot be reached by demurrer. The
plaintiff's complaint, requesting $983.35 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in pu-
nitive damages, sounded in fraudulent inducement to contract.
The Draeger holding was recently reaffirmed in Schmitt v. Osborne, 80 Wis. 2d 19,
257 N.W.2d 844 (1977), which involved an unjust enrichment cause of action and a
prayer for specific performance.
209. This assertion would seem to be correct. "Wisconsin does not recognize an
independent cause of action for punitive damages. Rather, punitive damages must
have a foundation of actual damages and specific aggravated conduct to 'attach or
rest upon."' Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 35, at 247.
210. This analogy may not seem appropriate given the fact that damages for fu-
ture medical expenses, etc., are compensatory and part of the action in tort, while
punitive damages are not compensatory and are awarded based upon the defendant's
conduct. The treatment of the punitive award and the language employed by Judge
Gordon, however, would seem to indicate that the legal effect of claims for punitive
damages and for future medical expenses is the same.
[Vol. 65:1
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
bility to the plaintiff. 2 11 In short, a cause of action owes its
existence to a set of operative facts. Generally, these facts in-
clude a primary right, a corresponding duty, a failure to per-
form that duty and resultant harm to the plaintiff.212 Al-
though each jurisdiction might vary the wording of this
definition of a "cause of action" somewhat, each definition
does include the same essential features of a cause of action.
One element of most causes of action is that a plaintiff
must have suffered some type of damage, whether it be actual
or nominal. Exemplary awards do not discuss such damages,
and therefore it is safe to conclude that a punitive damage
claim, standing alone, does not state an independent cause of
action.21 s Every jurisdiction reviewed for this work classifies a
punitive claim as "incident to" a basic cause of action.21'
There is no separate tort of "punitive damages," nor can a
plaintiff seek recovery of an exemplary award without basing
such claim upon an underlying legal theory of recovery which
involved some actual damages. Punitive damages will not be
awardable unless a plaintiff has suffered actual damages that
can be recompensed through an underlying cause of action.215
The problem lurking in the preceding rule of law is that
the term "actual damages" has not been well defined; some
courts equate actual damages with compensatory damages
only, while other courts hold that a nominal damage award
would constitute actual damages.216 Courts that limit the defi-
nition of actual damages to compensatory awards hold that
punitive damages are not recoverable without some compen-
satory award serving as an underlying basis of recovery.
Courts which broadly define "actual damages" will award pu-
nitive damages upon a showing of merely a nominal damage
211. McArthur v. Moffet, 143 Wis. 564, 570, 128 N.W. 445, 447 (1910).
212. Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 146, 293 N.W.2d
897, 902 (1980).
213. 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 241 (1965); see Wussow v. Commercial Mecha-
nisms, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 136, 279 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1979).
214. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Knag v. Harrington, 59
Hawaii 652, 587 P.2d 285 (1978); Pringle Tax Serv., Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d
151 (Iowa 1979); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979); Hilbert
v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959); Maxwell v. Kennedy, 50 Wis. 645, 7 N.W.
657 (1880).






The bottom line of the foregoing discussion is that most
jurisdictions reviewed require a complete cause of action to be
pleaded and proved before an exemplary award is possible.218
Although some jurisdictions require only nominal damages to
exist, such a requirement still constitutes an underlying cause
of action.219 Punitive damages are not awarded as an indepen-
dent theory of recovery.
Hilbert v. Roth is the case most often cited in support of
the preceding proposition. 220 The court held that the plaintiff
could not press his punitive claim against the defendant be-
cause the plaintiff's compensatory claim had already been sat-
isfied by a judgment against a joint tortfeasor of the defen-
dant. The court described the punitive damage claim as "a
mere incident to a cause of action - an element which the
jury may consider in making its determination - and not the
subject of an action in itself."'21
Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co. echoes the Hilbert ratio-
nale for denying punitive damages recovery. In an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial judge had
vacated a $5,000 compensatory jury award because the plain-
tiff had not adequately proved substantial mental suffering.
217. Id. For examples of jurisdictions which allow nominal awards to justify puni-
tive damages, see First Nat'l Realty Co. v. Weathers, 154 A.2d 548 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1959) and Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 291 A.2d 64 (1972). For an
example of cases rejecting punitive awards in the absence of compensatory damages,
see Barnard v. Cohen, 165 Wis. 417, 162 N.W. 480 (1917). But see Wussow v. Com-
mercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980), which casts some
doubt on the need for compensatory damages to support a punitive claim.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment c (1979); "It is essential,
however, that facts be established that, apart from punitive damages, are sufficient to
maintain a cause of action." Comment b also states that a cause of action based on a
particular tort must exist, at least as a cause of action justifying nominal damages.
219. Confusion as to this point sometimes leads a court to misinterpret the laws of
other jurisdictions regarding punitive damages. For instance, Judge Biggs in Basista
v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) commented that at least one jurisdiction (District
of Columbia) allowed punitive damages as an independent basis of recovery. The case
cited by Judge Biggs, First Nat'l Realty Co. v. Weathers, 154 A.2d 548 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1959), involved a cause of action calling for only nominal damages. Nevertheless,
an underlying cause of action was present. Judge Biggs apparently misinterpreted the
D.C. court's assertion that a punitive award was not contingent upon actual damages
on the basis of his own definition of what constituted a cause of action.
220. 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).
221. Id. at __, 149 A.2d at 652.
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The trial court, however, allowed the $10,000 exemplary
award to stand. The Supreme Court of Maine reversed the
trial court on the latter point, stating that "[o]nce the presid-
ing justice ruled that plaintiff had failed to establish liability
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the award
of $10,000 in punitive damages could no longer stand.
'222
The preceding cases show that proof of an underlying the-
ory of liability is a condition precedent to the recovery of an
exemplary award. In this context, exemplary damages become
an "add-on" to the plaintiff's recovery if particular facts war-
ranting such an add-on are proved. The first step, however, is
to satisfy all of the elements of the underlying cause of action.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, while accepting the need
for establishing the elements of a cause of action, has upheld
the award of punitive damages where there has been a settle-
ment of the compensatory claim. 223 The court's rationale for
upholding the award was based on the premise that punitive
damages constitute only one of a variety of remedies that a
plaintiff could recover in an action.224 In the event one of the
remedies is satisfied, the other remedies remain as long as the
cause of action continues to exist: "The fact that there was a
settlement and payment of the claim for compensatory dam-
ages in no way affected the continued existence of the cause of
action based on operative facts which could give rise to multi-
ple or alternative remedies. '225 From this, the court reasoned
that all that occurred as a result of the settlement was that
one of the plaintiffs claims for relief was satisfied while the
cause of action continued to exist.
Since the plaintiff in Wussow had recovered compensatory
damages the court did not reach the question of whether there
could be a remedy of punitive damages where there was no
compensatory damages recovery.226 From the language of
Wussow it is clear that the court is still going to require the
222. Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d at 155.
223. Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897
(1980).
224. Id. at 149-50, 294 N.W.2d at 904. Compensatory, special, injunctive and pu-
nitive damages are all considered remedies which a plaintiff may pursue upon estab-
lishing a cause of action.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 151, 293 N.W.2d at 905.
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plaintiff to establish a cause of action, which by definition re-
quires actual damage. What is left open in Wussow is whether
something other than compensatory damages will support an
award of punitive damages. Since the court did not address
the issue, it is safe to assume that prior case law defining the
term "actual damages" is still viable. In particular, Barnard v.
Cohen appears to be controlling on the definition of actual
damages.2 2 Barnard involved a libel action in which the jury
awarded no compensatory damages and $300 punitive dam-
ages. The trial court amended the verdict to "six cents." The
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, stating that punitive
damages cannot be recovered in an action where the compen-
satory damages are merely nominal.22 8 Hence, in light of Bar-
nard, Wisconsin appears to follow the "more than nominal
damage" rule. However, the reasoning of Wussow raises the
question of whether punitive damages are awardable when an
underlying cause of action has been stated, no matter what
type of damage is awarded.
The effect of the "more than nominal damage" rule is to
create situations in which punitive awards cannot be ren-
dered, no matter how aggravated the defendant's conduct,
without proving a compensable loss. The states which allow
nominal damages to constitute actual damages, on the other
hand, create the possibility of a punitive recovery in every
cause of action if the requisite aggravated conduct is shown.
A strong argument has been made for the allowance of an
exemplary award where only nominal damages are present.
Wardman-Justice Motors v. Petries stated that punitive
damages should be awarded in the absence of compensatory
damages "as something additional to, and in no wise depen-
dent upon, the actual pecuniary loss of the plaintiff, being fre-
quently given in actions 'where the wrong done to the plaintiff
is incapable of being measured by a money standard.' 1229
Wardman stands for the concept of awarding exemplary dam-
ages to provide compensation for legal breaches that would
otherwise go uncompensated23 0 Comment C to section 908A
227. Barnard v. Cohen, 165 Wis. 417, 162 N.W. 480 (1917).
228. Id.
229. Wardman-Justice Motors v. Petrie, 39 F.2d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
230. Tozer, supra note 5, at 300.
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of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also adopts this view.
Some jurisdictions hold that punitive damages are awarda-
ble when no exact compensation amount can be ascer-
tained, 31 when a plaintiff has sought equitable relief23 2 and
when the underlying compensatory claim has been compro-
mised and settled.2 3 These holdings are consistent with the
view that punitive damages are awardable when an underlying
cause of action has been stated, no matter what other type of
damages have been awarded.
3. Punitive Damages as a Form of "Gross" Negligence
The preceding section's explanation that punitive damages
are not an independent cause of action is consistent with
Judge Gordon's reasoning in Drake, i.e., punitive damages re-
present a specific type of relief rather than any form of a legal
cause of action. Nonetheless, Judge Gordon's fellow eastern
district court judge in Wisconsin, Robert Warren, criticized
the Drake decision and its interpretation of Wisconsin law in
Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc.
2 s4
Judge Warren granted a motion to strike punitive damage
allegations in a product liability complaint sounding in negli-
gence and strict liability. The complaint had alleged reckless
disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Stating that Wisconsin law
had eliminated gross negligence as a basis for punitive dam-
ages,235 the court held that allegations of wanton, willful or
reckless disregard of another's rights in a negligence action
only gave rise to "gross negligence"; in order to secure puni-
tive damages, the allegations of recklessness had to be part of
an underlying intentional tort theory of recovery.2 3
231. Pringle Tax Serv., Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151, 165 (Iowa 1979) in-
volved an exemplary award of $2,500 which was allowed even though the plaintiff
could not prove the exact amount of actual damages suffered because the defendant
had destroyed his business records. The defendant had violated a covenant not to
compete. The court stated that the principles of punishment and deterrence can be
served equally well whether actual damages are awarded or merely shown.
232. Village of Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310 (1969).
233. Stephenson v. Collins, 216 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1968). See also Hilbert v. Roth,
395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959). But see Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc.,
97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980).
234. 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
235. Id. at 384 (citing Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962)).
236. 433 F. Supp. at 385:
The somewhat ambiguous language in the Kink opinion to the effect that the
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Although Judge Warren's analysis under Wisconsin law
may not be relevant to the legal issues existing in other
states, 37 his premise of an intimate connection between a pu-
nitive damage recovery and an underlying form of action is a
crucial principle which has significant ramifications for all ju-
risdictions. It is clear that Judge Warren believes that a puni-
tive damage claim is dependent not only upon the conduct of
the defendant, but also upon the nature of the underlying le-
gal theory advanced by the plaintiff. As previously indicated,
a punitive damage claim "piggybacks" upon an underlying
cause of action; it has no independent basis for its assertion.
The crucial issue then becomes whether the "piggyback" or
"add-on" of the punitive damage claim is contingent only
upon a defendant's conduct (as Judge Gordon holds) or upon
a defendant's conduct and the form of the plaintiff's underly-
ing legal theory (as Judge Warren holds).
Of course, the Walbrun logic does not remove the possibil-
ity of exemplary damages in all product liability cases, but
rather only in those Wisconsin cases sounding in negligence
and/or strict liability. Judge Warren adhered to this logical
consistency 'in Kirschnik v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling
Co. He reasserted Walbrun's holding disallowing punitive
damage awards in negligence/strict liability suits, but refused
to dismiss or strike the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages
in the case before him because the plaintiff had also alleged a
cause of action against the defendant manufacturer based on
wanton, willful or reckless disregard of another's rights gives rise to punitive
damages must be construed in the context of that case. Such conduct when
viewed in the context of a negligence case merely gives rise to "gross negli-
gence." In the case of negligent conduct, however aggravating, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has expressly precluded the recovery of punitive damages.
At least one Wisconsin trial court has followed Judge Warren's logic. In Granger v.
Smeal Mfg. Co., No. 76-CI-0200 (Wash. County Cir. Ct., Wis., Apr. 29, 1978), the trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in a product liability action.
The court held that negligent conduct was not grounds for awarding punitive dam-
ages and that to recover such damages an intentional tort must be proven. The court
reasoned that since gross negligence had been abolished in Wisconsin, only conduct
evincing an intentional tort would be sufficient to support a punitive damage award.
237. The controversy raging in Wisconsin over the existence of gross negligence
and its use as a foundation for punitive damages can best be understood through
reading Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962); Kink v. Combs, 28
Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1964); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical




fraud and misrepresentation. The court reasoned that because
the elements of fraud required a showing of an intentional
false representation on the part of the defendant, proof of
such allegation could justify an exemplary award.238 The court
freely stated that under such circumstances punitive damages
may be recoverable in a product liability action:
The Court notes that such a possibility might also allow
the plaintiff to recover punitive damages in what is essen-
tially a products liability case. The Court believes, however,
in such a case where the plaintiff can show knowledge and
intent to defraud, that punitive damages might be appropri-
ate. Punitive damages are not usually appropriate in prod-
ucts liability cases based on negligence or strict liability be-
cause there is no requirement of showing that a producer
knew a product was defective when made and, therefore,
there is no showing of any wrongful action.2 9
Judge Gordon's holding in Drake would not allow the im-
position of an exemplary award if a defendant's liability
hinged solely on the existence of a defective product (a pure
Restatement section 402A basis); thus, there is no disagree-
ment between Drake and Walbrun on this point. However, if
the plaintiff could prove some type of aggravated conduct
(knowledge, at the least) by the defendant, Judge Gordon
would allow such proof to justify an exemplary award to be
"added on" to the strict liability cause of action. While it is
true that a strict liability theory does not require such a show-
ing, the author states that there is no authority for the pro-
position that strict liability prohibits such a showing or in any
way limits the possible remedies available for a plaintiff.240 He
concludes that punitive damage claims need not be proved by
238. Kirschnik v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 478 F. Supp. 842, 844-45
(E.D. Wis. 1979). The court stated:
The elements of a cause of action, based on fraud and misrepresentation, how-
ever, are different from the elements of a cause of action based on negligence
or strict liability.
Generally, to prevail on a cause of action founded on fraud, a plaintiff must
show: 1) a false representation; 2) made with intent to defraud and for the
purpose of inducing another to act on it; and 3) the other person must rely on
it to his detriment.
Id.
239. Id. at 845.
240. Owen, supra note 5, at 1269.
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facts identical to the underlying claim for compensatory dam-
ages. 241 The case of Fleet v. Hollenkemp stated: "[W]hether
exemplary damages should or should not be given does not
depend upon the form of action so much as upon the nature
and extent of the injury done and the manner in which it was
inflicted, whether by negligence, wantonness, or with or with-
out malice.
242
In emphasizing the incompability of a "strict liability"
product case with an award of punitive damages, one must be
careful not to stress form over substance. However, whatever
the conclusion as to whether the form of an underlying legal
theory of compensatory damages must be compatible with the
punitive damage claim, it must be remembered that facts
must be pleaded and proven over and above a strict liability
claim before punitive damages are to be allowed. It must be
conceded that the proof requirements of a "pure" strict liabil-
ity claim are incompatible with the proof requirements of a
punitive damage claim. Therefore, judges have to assume the
responsibility for not allowing a punitive damage claim to
prejudice the defendant's defense in the strict liability phase
of the case.
An exemplary award's focus on the defendant's conduct
could prejudice the jury's deliberation on the initial liability
question. It has been suggested that this can be resolved by
having separate hearings for each phase of the trial.243 This is
feasible and may be an equitable solution, but it will necessa-
rily add to the time, complexity and expense of the judicial
process.
Professor Owen states that punitive damage claims have
long been deemed compatible with negligence claims, despite
an exemplary award's need for substantially more proof re-
garding the malevolence of the defendant's conduct.244 He also
241. Id.
242. 52 Ky. at 180, 13 B. Mon. at 226.
243. See note 122 and accompanying text, supra. See also Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 323, 294 N.W.2d at 468-69.
244. Owen, supra note 5, at 1270. It should be remembered that the Walbrun
decision rested upon Wisconsin's removal of "gross negligence" as a basis for exem-
plary awards and stated that the definition of a strict liability action is negligence per
se. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962); Dippel v. Sciano, 37
Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
If a jurisdiction allows the imposition of punitive damages in negligence actions,
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points out that punitive awards have been ruled appropriate
in other actions based on principles of strict liability.245
Heil Co. v. Grant explicitly cited Drake in holding that pu-
nitive awards are tied to a defendant's conduct, not the un-
derlying theory of liability.248 Sturm, Ruger also rejected the
argument that punitive damages have no place in the fault-
free context of strict liability, although the court's opinion in-
adequately explained its rationale.24 7
Wisconsin, where the "inconsistency" argument was first
upheld by Judge Warren, has now rejected this argument and
has linked the awarding of punitive damages with the defen-
dant's conduct.248 But the most substantial attempt to discuss
the "inconsistency/incompatibility" argument is found in
Maxey v. Freightliner Corp.2 49 Maxey involved a trial court
verdict awarding $150,000 in compensatory damages and
$10,000,000 in punitive damages to a plaintiff whose parents
were killed when a truck manufactured by the defendant
tilted on its side and slid 288 feet to a stop, then erupted into
flames. The truck design had placed fuel tanks close to igni-
tion sources and occupants, without including absorber and
separable fuel line fittings. 250 The court rejected the defen-
dant's argument that exemplary awards were incompatible
with a strict liability lawsuit, explaining that the difference in
focus between the two theories was not significant:
The meaning of the argument that strict liability and re-
much of the force of the legal inconsistency argument is removed. However, Judge
Warren's holding that the punitive award is contingent on and limited by the case's
underlying theory of liability means that all jurisdictions must be cognizant of every
ruling's effect on subsequent punitive damage claims.
245. Owen, supra note 5, at 1270, citing cases involving nuisance, trespass to land,
ultrahazardous activities, negligence per se, implied warranty and defamation.
246. Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
247. 594 P.2d at 46-47.
248. As previously discussed in this work, federal judges in Wisconsin have taken
opposing viewpoints. Federal judge John Reynolds sided with Judge Gordon by al-
lowing a punitive damage claim in Simmons v. Atlas Mach., 475 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.
Wis. 1979). Wangen is a Wisconsin Supreme Court case supporting Judge Gordon's
viewpoint. A Wisconsin trial court in Granger v. Smeal Mfg. Co., No. 76-CI-0200
(Wash. County Cir. Ct., Wis., Apr. 29, 1978) followed Judge Warren's reasoning in
Walbrun, as did Judge McCormick in Klessig v. Boll, No. 453-106 (Milw. County Cir.
Ct., Wis., Jan. 12, 1979).
249. 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
250. Id. at 957.
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covery of punitive damages are conceptually incompatible is
not clear. Certainly one is said to be a no fault and the other
a fault concept .... The bases of recovery for strict liability
and exemplary damages are different. They are independent
concepts .... Because they are different concepts, their dif-
ferences in premises and purposes are beside the point. The
question is whether these two theories of recovery ought to
be joined in a single suit.2 51
Judge Higgenbotham answered the preceding question in
the affirmative, stressing that the issue was really a matter of
judicial efficiency. He believed that the joining of punitive
claims with strict liability theories created no true substantive
issues because the concept of fault still exists in a strict liabil-
ity context:
The point is that the risk of infecting a no-fault concept by
simultaneous presentation of a fault based claim is exagger-
ated in a mind that fails to perceive that present formula-
tion of strict liability grandly tosses fault out the front door
but quietly brings much of it through the back door with
language drawn from fault-riddled syntax.
252
The Maxey decision supports the Drake side of the
punitive damages argument, but at first reading Judge Hig-
genbotham seems to reach his ultimate conclusion through
different reasoning from that employed by Judge Gordon.
Drake reasoned that a punitive damage claim represents a
specific type of relief, while Maxey uses language describing
the punitive damage claim as a theory, thereby implying that
it may be a separable cause of action. Indeed, the Texas Con-
stitution expressly enumerates circumstances under which ex-
emplary damages can be recovered.2 53
251. Id. at 961.
252. Id. at 962. The court was referring to such language as the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement. In the court of appeals decision affirming the district court
the court agreed that exemplary damages may be appropriate in certain instances,
but in the case before it the evidence did not support a finding of "conscious indiffer-
ence" to rights of others. 623 F.2d at 398-99.
253. TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 26 states:
Every person, corporation, or company, that may commit a homocide,
through willful act, omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsible in exem-
plary damages, to the surviving husband, widow, heirs of his or her body, or
such of them as there may be, without regard to any criminal proceeding that
may or may not be had in relation to the homicide.
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The interpretive commentary to article 16, section 26 of
the Texas Constitution and subsequent Texas court cases,
however, indicate that the punitive damage claim is still "inci-
dent" to the underlying cause of action and not a separate
action unto itself.2" Therefore, the Maxey rationale can be
reconciled with the Drake reasoning despite the different lan-
guage employed.
It is obvious that most courts have not accepted the "in-
consistency/incompatibility" argument against punitive dam-
ages in strict liability cases.2 55 WaIbrun is the only reported
case which has dismissed a punitive claim on an "inconsis-
tency" basis. Despite this judicial agreement, there have not
been numerous cases explaining why the inconsistency argu-
ment should fail or what the exact nature of a punitive dam-
age claim is. Because there is an absence of authority defining
a punitive claim as a separate cause of action, it may be de-
duced that an exemplary award is not a cause of action unto
itself. Therefore, Judge Gordon's analysis that an exemplary
award represents a type of relief and not a theory or cause of
action for recovery is supportable in logic. The punitive claim
is not limited by the underlying cause of action, but depends
only on a sufficient showing of the facts necessary to provide
such relief, i.e., reckless conduct by the defendant.
E. When Punitive Damages Will Be Awarded in Strict
Liability Cases
1. Type of Conduct Needed
With apparent court acceptance of punitive damage
awards in product liability lawsuits, it is imperative that man-
ufacturers and other business concerns become aware of what
conduct will warrant an exemplary award. From the opposite
perspective, plaintiff's counsel must also consider a product
liability defendant's potential liability for an exemplary
award, since the economic feasibility of bringing suit is much
The court of appeals in Maxey recognized that the availability of exemplary damages
flows from this provision of the Texas Constitution. 623 F.2d at 398.
254. See Annot., Tsx. CONST. art. 16, § 26 (interpretive commentary); Wilson v.
Brown, 154 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); City of Dallas v. Halford, 210 S.W. 725
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
255. The proposed Uniform Product Liability Act also retains punitive damages
in strict liability cases. See Model Act, supra note 120.
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greater if an exemplary award can be obtained.
In general, the punitive damages standard of conduct de-
scribed by most courts is similar. Each court may employ dif-
ferent phraseology or terminology in fashioning an exemplary
award standard, but the relevant consideration ultimately
narrows to an assessment of the extent to which a defendant's
conduct exhibited a conscious, reckless indifference to the risk
that its product might be excessively dangerous to consum-
ers.266 Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., the first modern pu-
nitive damages/strict liability case, stated that a corporation
may be held liable for punitive damages when it performs an
act "in ill will, or is motivated by actual malice .... The
court elaborated further in explaining that malice involves
wrongful conduct which is "willful, intentional, and done in




The preceding "reckless disregard" language is common in
most courts' formulations of punitive damage standards. Illi-
nois requires a showing of careless conduct so gross as to show
a "lack of regard" for the safety of others.2 59 Rinker v. Ford
Motor Co. stated that a defendant's conduct warrants puni-
tive damages when it shows "complete indifference to or con-
scious disregard for the safety of others. 21 6 0 Arizona law, as
expressed in d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel, awards punitive
damages upon a finding of "reckless indifference to the safety
of others.
'2 61
Wisconsin law, in addition to adopting the "reckless disre-
gard" standard, defines the governing principle in allowing
punitive damage awards to be the presence of "circumstances
of aggravation" in the tortious injury, or in short, conduct
which is "outrageous. '262 Other jurisdictions' cases also em-
ploy language describing a recklessness or indifference to the
rights or safety of others as their standard of exemplary award
256. Owen, supra note 5, at 1326.
257. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 703, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
258. Id. at 704, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
259. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Il. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), af'd, 46
Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
260. 567 S.W.2d at 667.
261. 552 F.2d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 1977).




One court has attacked the "reckless disregard" standard
as insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. 2" G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County in-
volved a strict liability claim against the manufacturer of
birth control pills for failure to warn about the possibility of
blood clots. The court held that punitive damages were recov-
erable in a strict liability action but only upon a showing of
evil. motive on the part of the defendant. The court went on to
hold that when nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations
that defendant's conduct was willful, wanton or reckless do
not support a claim for punitive damages since such allega-
tions do not charge malice or evil motive.26 5 The court reiter-
ated that the central spirit behind exemplary damages is vio-
lated by an award founded on recklessness alone. The court
then suggested that a "conscious disregard of safety" standard
was sufficient to describe the necessary malice or evil motive
in a claim for punitive damages based on nondeliberate con-
duct.2 6 In short, the court's criticism of the "reckless disre-
gard" standard was premised on its requirement that evil mo-
tive be found in order to constitute a punitive damage award.
As gleaned from the preceding cases and Professor Owen's
summation of the appropriate judicial standard,6 7 a defen-
dant will be susceptible to a punitive damage award when it
manufactures or distributes a defective product under circum-
stances which show a reckless or conscious disregard of the
safety of users or consumers of the product. This general stan-
dard, however, does not assist a business concern in the for-
mulation of adequate company policies and practices designed
to prevent the future imposition of punitive awards. To suc-
cessfully advise any business concern on appropriate business
263. See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. at 963; Thomas v. Ameri-
can Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 266-67 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Sturm, Ruger
& Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d at 46. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
264. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct. of Sacramento County, 49 Cal. App. 2d 22,
122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
265. Id. at 28-29, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
266. Id.
267. See text accompanying note 256. Owen, supra note 5, at 1326 states: "The
standard of punitive damages liability to be proposed will center on the extent to
which the marketing conduct of a manufacturer exhibits a conscious or reckless indif-
ference to the risk that its products may be excessively dangerous to consumers."
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procedures, the judicial standard of "reckless or conscious in-
difference to the rights or safety of others" must be given a
specific meaning: what type of conduct shows such a reckless
indifference? Court cases involving the imposition of punitive
damages in product liability suits must be analyzed in order
to translate the punitive damages standard into workable
guidelines from which product manufacturers or distributors
can determine appropriate conduct. Professor Owen analyzed
five types of business conduct 268 and found that punitive dam-
ages will possibly be awarded for three distinct types of busi-
ness abuse:
1. Failing to acquire sufficient product safety information;
2. Failing to remedy an excessively dangerous condition by
altering design, providing warnings, or recall;
3. Knowingly misleading the public.2 9
Professor Owen indicated that category three calls for a
punitive award, but categories one and two are close to mere
negligence. 70 Therefore, a defendant manufacturer guilty of
conduct outlined in categories one or two must also have been
aware of or culpably indifferent to the existing risk of injury,
or must have intransigently refused to reduce the danger or to
determine its seriousness, to warrant the imposition of a puni-
tive damage award.271
Through an analysis of the factual circumstances involved
in reported court cases, a series of common circumstances
emerges from which a loose list of punitive damages "ele-
ments" may be compiled.
268. Professor Owen analyzed the following types of conduct:
1. Fraudulent misconduct;
2. Knowing violations of safety standards;
3. Inadequate testing and manufacturing procedures;
4. Failure to warn of known dangers before marketing;
5. Post-marketing failure to remedy known dangers.
Owen, supra note 5, at 1361.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1361-62. "Since the third form of misconduct is characterized by an
intent to deceive and thus is akin to fraud, it cries out for punitive damages liability.
However, the first two as described above are similar to mere negligence and thus are




2. The Nature of Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
The Toole case is a logical place to begin a case-by-case
analysis of punitive damages because it is the first modern pu-
nitive damages/products liability case and because it involved
extremely blameworthy conduct by the defendant.272 As previ-
ously indicated, Toole involved a drug company which distrib-
uted a drug called MER/29 to approximately 400,000 persons.
MER/29 caused the development of cataracts in its consum-
ers, and the evidence adduced at trial proved that defendant
Richardson-Merrell knew of the potential danger of MER/29
before marketing the drug.
Before marketing MER/29 in 1960, Richardson-Merrell
had conducted at least six tests or studies which provided sig-
nificant indications that MER/29 posed the possibility of dan-
gerous side effects.27 3 Despite these results, Richardson-Mer-
rell altered the test conclusions and, in effect, lied in reports
to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) about the poten-
tial side effects of MER/29 4 The defendant also promoted
MER/29 to professional medical groups, advertising that it
was "virtually" nontoxic and remarkably free from side effects
even in prolonged clinical use.27
As MER/29 was marketed, Richardson-Merrell began to
receive reports from independent physicians or researchers
that patients and animals consuming MER/29 were suffering
significant side effects. 276 Despite this information, the defen-
272. See Owen, supra note 5.
273. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d at 694-95, 60 Cal. Rptr.
at 404-05. The first test showed that all female rats on a high dosage of MER/29 died.
The second test showed abnormal blood changes in all rats which were given a re-
duced dosage of MER/29. The third test showed abnormal blood changes in monkeys
given MER/29. The fourth test showed that nine of ten rats developed eye opacities.
The fifth test showed one dog developing eye opacities and blindness. The sixth test
showed 25 out of 36 rats developing eye opacities.
274. Id. Richardson-Merrell did not inform the FDA of the abnormal blood
changes in the first three tests. It filed a report which altered the number of deaths in
animal test groups and which also made up animals which had never existed. All
information concerning the eye opacities and blindness of the animals was withheld
from the FDA. Id.
275. Defendant's brochures hailed the nontoxicity of MER/29, and Merrell also
held conferences with research doctors to point out the lack of side effects of MER/
29.
276. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 695-96, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05. Two months after MER/
29 was on the market, defendant received information of independent research which
showed rats on MER/29 developing lenticular and corneal eye opacities. Merrell also
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dant continued to market MER/29, resisted FDA requests for
MER/29 withdrawal from the market, and remained adamant
that MER/29 was safe. Only after FDA officials made a sur-
prise visit to Richardson-Merrell laboratories and confiscated
its animal experiment records did the defendant withdraw
MER/29 from the market.
2 7 8
MER/29 had been administered to 400,000 persons before
it was withdrawn, and 490 cases of cataracts were reported.2 79
It had grossed $7,000,000 in sales, and as Richardson-Mer-
rell's vice-president stated, was "the biggest and most impor-
tant drug in Merrell history.
'2 80
Several evidentiary conclusions can be drawn from the
foregoing facts. First, it is apparent that Merrell had knowl-
edge of the defect in MER/29. All of the animal tests con-
ducted by Merrell showed resulting eye problems or death.
Tests performed after the marketing of MER/29 also showed
eye opacities developing in all animals placed on MER/29. In
one test conducted by Richardson-Merrell itself, twenty of
twenty-four rats became blind.281 The evidence plainly
showed that the defendant knew of a blindness-causing defect
in MER/29.
Second, the evidence supported the existence of substan-
tial financial reasons for Merrell to desire that MER/29 stay
on the market as long as possible. As previously noted, defen-
dant's executive officers believed MER/29 to be the most im-
portant drug ever marketed by Richardson-Merrell;
$7,000,000 in sales in its first year clearly illustrated the
potential financial return offered by MER/29.
Third, defendant took no steps to research and remedy the
defect. Merrell marketed the drug without waiting to achieve
more satisfactory test results and did not cease selling MER/
29 even after learning of eye problems involving human con-
sumers of the drug. There was no pause in marketing MER/29
in order to remedy its obvious side effects.
learned of a human patient who had developed a film over his eyes after using MER/
29.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 698, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 696-97, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
[Vol. 65:1
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Fourth, Merrell actually attempted to cover up the defect
in reports to the FDA and in promotional material delivered
to research groups. Falsification of scientific test data and bla-
tant misrepresentation in MER/29 advertising showed an at-
tempt to conceal the defect by defendant.
Fifth, Richardson-Merrell's conduct clearly fell below nor-
mal operating standards of the drug-marketing industry.
There was expert testimony elicited at trial that defendant,
based upon information in its possession, should have with-
drawn MER/29 from the market.
282
Sixth, the Toole decision did not clearly indicate whether
MYER/29 was achieving its stated purpose, i.e., the reduction
of cholesterol levels in human blood. The only indication of
MER/29's effectiveness in Justice Salsman's opinion is a refer-
ence to an article critical of MER/29 in "Medical Letter," a
reputable medical publication.2 83 Although it does not explic-
itly declare MER/29 to be ineffective, the court's opinion does
give the impression that the drug was not providing any bene-
fits to its users.
Seventh, there was no evidence cited in the Toole opinion
that Merrell possessed any knowledge concerning the means
whereby the MER/29 defect could be remedied. The defen-
dant simply did not research, experiment or attempt to find a
solution to the MER/29 problem.
Based on the foregoing evidentiary conclusions, the court
upheld the punitive damage award against Richardson-Mer-
rell, reasoning that the jury could reasonably conclude that
defendant "brought its drug to market, and maintained it on
the market, in reckless disregard of the possibility that it
would visit serious injury upon persons using it. ' '2 " The court
further commented that the jury could easily infer that defen-
dant's advertising and promotional activities were recklessly
282. Id.
283. Id. The article commented:
"There is no proof, however, that the drug influences the pathologic basis or
the clinical course of atherosclerosis of the coronary or other arteries ...
'Medical Letter' consultants believe that the drug should still be reserved for
experimental trial. . . to repeat-it has not been shown that the reduction of
blood cholesterol levels serves any therapeutic purpose."
Id. at 696, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
284. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 706, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
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carried out in wanton disregard for the safety of MER/29
users because of the defendant's knowledge of the dangerous
MER/29 propensities.2 85
For the purposes of this work's analysis, therefore, the fac-
tual "elements" of the Toole punitive damage award are as
follows:
1. Defendant has knowledge of the existence of the defect
(and the resultant degree of danger that the defect poses).
2. Defendant possesses knowledge of substantial economic
benefits to be gained by continuing to market a defective
product without further testing or without issuing warnings
or product recalls.
3. Defendant fails to research diligently or make other ef-
forts to remedy the defect.
4. The defective product offers no substantial benefits
which would outweigh the risk of marketing a product in a
defective state.
5. Defendant fraudulently misleads government regulators
or the consuming public in marketing or promoting its
product.
6. Defendant's conduct in marketing the defective product
falls below accepted industry standards.
If the preceding six circumstances are present in a defec-
tive product situation, a punitive damage award is inevitable.
The question arises whether all of these six elements or a par-
ticular combination of them is required to warrant a punitive
damage award.
3. Elements Needed for a Punitive Damage Award
a. Defendant's Knowledge or Awareness of the Existence
of a Defect
Immediately upon inspection of the "conscious or reckless
disregard of the safety of others" standard for punitive dam-
ages, it should be apparent that a defendant who is unaware
of a product's defect can hardly be "consciously" or "reck-
lessly" disregarding any other party's rights. The cases bear
out the proposition that in every case of punitive damages,
the defendant manufacturer was aware of the existing defect




posed by such defect.
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co. involved an unopened can of
Drano which spontaneously exploded when moisture entered
the can through a loose cap and reacted with the chemicals in
the drain cleaner, thereby producing enough gaseous pressure
to burst the can. 86 The court found that the defendant knew
the chemicals contained in Drano were greatly destructive to
human tissue and that Drano's contents would generate gase-
ous pressure if moisture entered the can.28 7 Defendant also
knew of prior claims of spontaneous explosions of Drano2 "8
Despite this knowledge, defendant distributed the can with-
out determining its ability to withstand pressure and without
manufacturing the can so as to create an excess pressure re-
lease through its cap.28 9
Other cases allowing punitive damages also involved defen-
dants with knowledge of a product defect or of the possibility
of such defect. Gillham v. Admiral Corp. involved a television
set which caught fire because the insulation around its trans-
former could not withstand the heat generated by the trans-
former and the set's fire containment cage was inadequate to
control any resultant fire. 90 Admiral learned of the defect af-
ter the television set was marketed when it received reports
from customers that the sets were igniting and high voltage
fires were destroying home furnishings and dwellings. 29
1
Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. involved a pair of children's
pajamas which ignited because the material they were made
of was highly flammable.292 Evidence was introduced showing
that the manufacturer of the cotton material had knowledge
of a number of clothing fires involving the material in ques-
tion and that the manufacturer's testing procedure was defec-
286. 116 Ill. App. 2d at 126-29, 253 N.E.2d at 644-45. The explosion sprayed
chemicals into plaintiffs eyes, causing her to become blind.
287. Id. at 136-37, 253 N.E.2d at 649.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 131, 136-37, 253 N.E.2d at 646, 649. The excess pressure release would
have prevented the can from bursting completely apart.
290. 523 F.2d 102, 105-06 (6th Cir. 1975).
291. Id. at 106. The punitive damage issue in Gillham involved the defendant's
action subsequent to learning of the initial fires, so the requisite knowledge was
present.
292. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub
nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 101 S..Ct. 320 (1980).
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tive.2 93 Perhaps the most damaging testimony was a memo-
randum sent by the corporate management to the research
department indicating that the company was "sitting on a
powder keg" with respect to injury caused by the material's
flammability.
294
In Wangen, Ford Motor Company learned that its 1967
Ford Mustang had defects from tests run by Ford on the vehi-
cle and from accident reports.295 Similarly, Rinker involved
Ford Motor Company learning of its LTD's defect through
twenty-nine reports of accidents involving broken fast idle
cams. 296 d'Hedouville involved a defendant marketing an ac-
rylic fiber designed to be used in carpeting products with
knowledge that such fiber ignited readily and did not self-ex-
tinguish.297 Sturm, Ruger involved a gun manufacturer which
sold firearms knowing that the revolver presented a significant
danger of accidental discharge because of the propensity of
the engaging middle parts to fail or break; the defendant also
knew that serious injuries had resulted from this deficiency. 98
All of these cases allowed punitive damage awards.
The court in Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers,
Inc. refused to award punitive damages because there was no
evidence of recklessness by the defendant.29  The court
pointed out that a finding of recklessness requires a readily
perceptible danger and a conscious choice to act despite clear
knowledge of a highly probable risk of serious harm. The case
involved a surgeon's use of an optical telescope which was not
adequately insulated; the surgeon received an electrical burn
to his cornea while placing his eye against the instrument's
eyepiece during surgery.
293. Id. at 734.
294. Id.
295. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). Although Wangen involved a motion
to strike punitive damages from the complaint, the court held that Ford's knowledge
of the danger was necessary to any allegation of punitive damages. Id. at 309-10, 294
N.W. 2d at 462.
296. 567 S.W.2d at 667.
297. d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel, 552 F.2d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 1977). In Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 22 ATLA L. REP. 349 (Colo. 1980) the manufacturer was spe-
cifically aware of the numerous dangerous side effects of the Dalkon Shield, including
the fact that the device was causing septic abortions.
298. 594 P.2d at 47.
299. 414 F. Supp. at 266-67.
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The court found that although the defendant knew doctors
were using the insulated instrument for direct viewing during
operations, it did not realize the specific type of hazard that
was involved in this particular area. No instances or similar
occurrences had been reported to defendant; the injuries it
knew of had always been accompanied by some other mal-
function of the instrument. There had been no previous inju-
ries to a surgeon's eyes.300
Explaining its legal rationale, the court stated that just be-
cause a risk was foreseeable "does not mean, contrary to
plaintiff's assertion, that the risk was fully realized, or at least,
realized to the extent necessary to show that degree of knowl-
edge which when consciously disregarded deserves the appel-
lation of 'recklessness.' "3o
In summary, case law establishes that a defendant must
have specific knowledge of a product's defect and its potential
for harm before an exemplary award is appropriate. This
knowledge is usually gained through the defendant's testing
procedures before marketing or through post-marketing con-
sumer accident reports and complaints received by the
defendant.
3 0 2
b. Economic Benefit to Defendant
The court in the Toole case stressed the immense profit-
ability of MER/29 to Richardson-Merrell. 30 3 The figures in-
volved obviously illustrated the significant incentive Merrell
had to keep MER/29 on the market, thereby suggesting a mo-
tivation for its misrepresentations.
No other case reviewed for this work, however, explicitly
discussed the profitability factor of the particular defendant's
course of action. Because every potential product recall, cessa-
300. Id. at 266.
301. Id. at 267.
302. The Defense Research Institute has concluded that the history of the prod-
uct will frequently show industry awareness of a problem. This is usually accom-
plished by obtaining an expert and checking into the testing procedures of the prod-
uct. Once the plaintiff's attorney has proved the defect, supposedly notice is proved,
because the manufacturer knows the results of the tests done on the product. Even if
the manufacturer does not test, punitive damages are recoverable if testing would
have pointed out the defect. Defense Research Institute, Plaintiffs Strategy for De-
fense Attorneys, at 6 (Sept. 1980).
303. See text accompanying note 280 supra.
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tion of product marketing or other delay in marketing in-
volves additional expense or reduction of profits to the partic-
ular manufacturer, it is safe to say that every factual situation
in which punitive damages arise creates the same financial in-
centive for all defendants. Such incentive varies in degree and
not in kind and therefore should not be highly probative, ex-
cept in unusual and/or blatant circumstances. 04
For the preceding reason and because no other court has
found a defendant's profit motive sufficiently important to
comment upon, it is probable that such motive is not an "ele-
ment" of punitive damages. If a plaintiff can introduce such
evidence at trial, although not required, it would be relevant
as to the amount of damages that should be awarded.
c. Defendant's Failure to Take Adequate Precautionary or
Remedial Steps
The awarding of punitive damages obviously assumes the
existence of a defective product on the market. The existence
of this defective product on the market indicates that its pro-
ducer-distributor did not detect the defect before marketing
and has not remedied the defect after marketing. An exem-
plary award means that the defendant breached its applicable
standard of care in the premarketing testing of its product or
in the postmarketing remedying of the product defect. All
cases involving the imposition of a punitive award bear this
out.
In Toole, the defendant's failures were obvious. Although
Richardson-Merrell conducted numerous tests on MER/29, it
failed to delay its marketing of the drug to allow for follow-up
304. Such "profitability" evidence, however, should be highly persuasive to a jury.
The punitive award in the Ford v. Grisham case, which totaled $125 million, was
reached because the jury believed Ford had left the Pinto design unsafe in order to
make money. Consequently, the jury determined its award by reasoning that Ford
had saved $100 million by retaining the defective product and then adding $25 mil-
lion more for "punishment." Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 4. But see note 94
supra for an example of juries' application of the profitability question. See also De-
fense Research Institute, Plaintiff's Strategy for Defense Attorneys, at 6 (Sept.
1980). This article postulates that the cost of benefit argument is the essence of a
punitive damage award. This argument helps to illustrate the motive of the manufac-
turers. It helps the plaintiff's attorney condition the jury from the beginning that the
manufacturer's motive was cost savings.
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tests and/or alterations to MER/29.3 05 Merrell's postmarket-
ing behavior also exhibited a startling lack of care."°' Cases
subsequent to Toole all involved some type of substandard or
negligent conduct by the defendant.
In Gryc, defendant manufacturer, after learning of its
product's high flammability, failed to treat its fabric with
readily available flame-retardant chemicals because of the
cost factor. 307 In Wangen, it was alleged that Ford Motor
Company failed to recall or issue warnings concerning the gas
tank defects in the 1967 Ford Mustang.308 In Moore, the de-
fendant failed to adequately pressure-test its Drano cans.309 In
Giliham, Admiral conducted only one heat test on its televi-
sion transformers before releasing the design for produc-
tion;310 after learning of the defect, it failed to redesign the
television set or to issue a warning to consumers."' In
d'Hedouville, the defendant did not test the flammability of
its Type 26 fiber and it continued to sell the fiber after learn-
ing of the fire hazards posed by the product. '12 The defendant
in Sturm, Ruger suffered the imposition of a punitive award
even though the company had issued a general warning of the
defect in the instructions accompanying its gun because it
failed to change the basic design of its revolver's engaging
middle parts;313 the remedial design change would have in-
creased the cost by $1.93 per gun. 1 4
These cases all indicate that the punitively liable defen-
dant has been at fault in some respect during the course of its
operations. This fault can take many forms, including inade-
quately testing a potentially dangerous product,31 5 inadequate
305. See notes 273-78 and accompanying text, supra.
306. Id.
307. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub
nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
308. 97 Wis. 2d at 309, 294 N.W.2d at 462. In Richardson v. Ford Motor Co., 23
ATLA L. REP. 323 (Ala. 1980) it was alleged that Ford had changed the manufactur-
ing process for steering column tabs one and one-half years before the accident, but
failed to recall all of the vehicles until five years after the accident.
309. See notes 286-89 and accompanying text, supra.
310. 523 F.2d at 104.
311. Id. at 109.
312. 552 F.2d at 894.
313. 594 P.2d at 41, 47.
314. Id. at 47.
315. See, e.g., d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel, 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977); Moore
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attempts to discover a means to remedy a product defect,316
failure to provide an adequate warning of the defect to con-
sumers317 or failure to implement known remedial mea-
sures.318 The defendant's conduct can occur in relation to
product design, production, promotion or distribution. Some
type of fault, whatever its nature, must be placed on the de-
fendant in order to justify a punitive award. The punitive
damage standard of "reckless indifference" necessarily in-
cludes some type of fault or negligent conduct by the defen-
dant. But the necessity of such a showing of fault should be
stressed because the underlying compensatory theory of liabil-
ity, if based upon strict liability principles, will not involve
any examination of the defendant's conduct. Therefore, if a
plaintiff seeks a punitive damage award, he must, in effect,
prove a "gross" negligence case as well as a Restatement sec-
tion 402A case. Proof of the manufacturing of a defective
product (via 402A) plus the defendant's knowledge of the de-
fect's existence will not be sufficient to warrant an exemplary
award. The defendant must have been "reckless" in its mar-
keting of the product.
An excellent example of this fault requirement for a puni-
tive damage award is Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., wherein
plaintiffs recovered a compensatory award but were denied a
punitive award against the manufacturer of a defective air-
plane.319 Although the evidence showed that the defendant
knew of a defect in the fuel system of its airplane, 3 0 the court
v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 Ill.2ai 288, 263
N.E.2d 103 (1970); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. de-
nied sub noma. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
316. See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975); Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
317. See, e.g., d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel, 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977); Gillham
v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975); Richardson v. Ford Motor Co., 23
ATLA L. RFP. 323 (Ala. 1980); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d
437 (1980).
318. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979); Moore v.
Jewel Tea Co., 116 IlM. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263
N.E.2d 103 (1970); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. de-
nied sub noma. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
319. 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
320. Id. at 1091. The airplane design did not include a "baffle" in the fuel tank to
prevent fuel from moving away from the fuel outlet during certain air maneuvers.
Consequently, when fuel did move away from the fuel outlet, the plane engines would
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affirmed the trial judge's refusal to submit the punitive dam-
age issue to the jury because the defendant had provided no-
tice of the defect to plane purchasers and had warned against
certain prolonged flight maneuvers . 21 Therefore, there was no
negligence or conscious indifference exhibited by the
defendant.
32 2
Maxey v. Freightliner Corp. also involved a defendant who
knew of its product's design defect and yet escaped liability
for punitive damages.3 2 The court held that because defen-
dant utilized the same truck design as the remainder of the
nation's trucking industry, it could not be held to have acted
intentionally, willfully or so grossly negligently as to approxi-
mate a fixed purpose to bring about injury to the plaintiff.3 24
The court stated that it could not at that time find that the
entire national trucking industry had shown such callous in-
difference to the safety of others. 25
The Maxey and Kritser cases indicate that a clear finding
of fault on the part of the defendant is required in order to
warrant an exemplary award. The term "fault" has been used
to describe this required element because the use of "negli-
gence" would prove extremely confusing. In addition, the
showing of fault in a punitive damage case must exceed ordi-
nary negligence; otherwise, the exemplary award concept of
strict liability cases will simply have created a lesser standard




321. Id. at 1096-97.
322. Id.
323. See notes 249-54 and accompanying text, supra.
324. 450 F. Supp. at 964. The court pointed out that no government regulator had
attacked this design, and it had been adopted and utilized by the trucking industry
for over 30 years.
325. Id. The court of appeals held that there could not be "conscious indiffer-
ence" to the welfare of others if it was shown that the defendant exercised even
"slight care." The court went on to affirm the district court on the grounds that the
record was devoid of evidence of defendant's failure to use even "slight care." Hence,
in Texas punitive damages are awardable only when the defendant has failed to exer-
cise even the "slightest care" for plaintiff's safety. 623 F.2d at 399.
326. Owen, supra note 5, at 1362. Owen notes that the conduct which has suffered
punitive repudiation in past strict liability cases has sounded very similar to negli-
gence. He points out, however, that in such cases the defendant must have exhibited
an intransigent refusal to reduce danger or to determine its seriousness or the defen-
dant must be aware or culpably indifferent to an unnecessary risk of injury.
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A finding of manufacturer "fault" involves an assessment
of the appropriateness of a defendant's failure to follow a
safer course of action (more tests, better warnings, remedial
measures, product recalls) in relation to its product. The fac-
tors involved in such an assessment are many and varied.
In determining whether a defendant is at fault in its test-
ing/quality control procedures, two crucial factors are the po-
tential danger posed by the product and the inherent financial
difficulty of providing completely adequate testing. Professor
Owen suggests the example of producing a "crash-worthy" air-
plane; prohibitive costs clearly rule out the alternative of test-
crashing Cessna airplanes.2 7 On the other hand, the greater
the potential risk involved with a particular product, the more
money should be spent on testing and quality control. 28
In relation to situations which require a fair warning to
consumers of a product's potential hazards, manufacturers
should provide all information necessary to allow adequate
testing by product consumers; complex products require some
information to be distributed. 29 Professor Owen summarizes
warning requirements by stating that they must be: (1) likely
to reach the consumers; (2) transmitted in a way that will at-
tract attention; and (3) in understandable form. 3 He cau-
tions against warnings that are too vague,3 1 not prompt,38 2 or
This added degree of culpability is also present in this author's formulation of
punitive damage "elements" in that the defendant must have knowledge of the de-
fect. With such knowledge required, any sort of "fault" or negligent conduct quickly
falls into the categories articulated by Professor Owen.
327. Id. at 1341-42. In Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., the circuit court also con-
cluded that Freightliner's compliance with industry custom negated any finding of
"conscious indifference" to the welfare of others. But the dissent did cite a case
wherein punitive damages were awarded despite compliance with industry custom.
Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 70-9255-L (193d Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas County,
Tex., Nov. 26, 1972), noted in Owen, supra note 5, at 1341-42.
328. Owen supra note 5, at 1343. Owen cites a Kansas trial court case in,'olving an
intrauterine device as an example of a product which should be more carefully tested:
Deemer v. A.H. Robins Co., No. C-26420 (Dist. Ct. Sedgwick County, Kan., filed Oct.
1972).
329. Owen, supra note 5, at 1354. Owen points out that providing sufficient infor-
mation and warnings to consumers is an effective means whereby defendant can shift
safety monitoring responsibilities to the public.
330. Id. at 1349.
331. Id. at 1348 (citing Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.
1973)).
332. Id. at 1347.
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insufficient to give clear notice of the extent or nature of the
danger presented.33
When a manufacturer learns of a serious injury-causing de-
fect in its product after it has been marketed, it should act
promptly and decisively to either remedy the defect or remove
the product from the market.3 Case law supports this pro-
position; for example, Gillham, 33 5 d'Hedouville,s6 Rinker,33"
Toole,33 s Gryc'3 9 and Wangen3 40 all involved considerable
manufacturer fault occurring after product marketing.
A punitive damages award requires some type of fault on
the part of the defendant. The fault can occur in a number of
areas, including both premarketing and postmarketing activi-
ties. When this fault, i.e., the defendant choosing an unsafe
course of action, is combined with the defendant's knowledge
of the product defect and its attendant dangers, the resultant
conduct will approach the level of "reckless indifference to the
safety and rights of others."
d. Defective Product Offers No Substantial Benefits
Which Would Outweigh the Risk
The Toole opinion noted that the defective product, MER/
29, had not shown that it could actually accomplish its pur-
pose, i.e., to reduce cholesterol levels in the blood stream.341
Although this point was not essential to the court's reasoning,
it does raise the question of whether the resultant benefits
that a product provides for society will ever outweigh the dan-
ger posed by a defect existing in the product, thereby remov-
ing the basis for a punitive damage award.
The cases have not discussed this question. Some of the
cases simply involved everyday products or products which
did not provide any truly substantial benefit to society. 2
333. Id. (citing Johnson v. Husky, 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976)).
334. Owen, supra note 5, at 1360.
335. 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975).
336. 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977).
337. 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
338. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 897, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
339. 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc,
101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
340. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
341. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 897, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
342. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co. involved a can of Drano; Giliham v. Admiral Corp.
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Rinker v. Ford Motor Co. involved a defective automobile, but
the defect could have been remedied relatively easily.343 Court
opinions which have refused to provide punitive damages have
not justified such refusal based on the benefit-outweighs-cost
comparison. 4 In short, the issue has simply not arisen.
The MER/29 cases, had they involved a highly successful
drug product, could have presented the issue of product bene-
fits versus product harm. Even if MER/29 had been effective
in reducing cholesterol levels, however, the defendant would
still have been considered reckless in failing to warn consum-
ers of the adverse side effects. The case for punitive damages
against Richardson-Merrell would still be very strong.
Hypothesizing a defendant-manufacturer which had ade-
quately warned the public of a product defect poses the ques-
tion of whether such defendant could be held liable for an ex-
emplary award for distributing a beneficial, yet defective,
product. The answer probably depends on whether the defen-
dant could have taken any reasonable steps to remedy the de-
fect. Rinker, for example, involved a beneficial product - the
Ford LTD - which contained a defectively designed carbure-
tor and fast idle cam. 45 Despite the obvious utility of the au-
tomobile, Ford was held liable for $400,000 in punitive dam-
ages because the defect could have been remedied. 46
Thus, it would seem logical that the defendant's argument
that it distributed a defective product because of its potential
benefits to society would tend to be a consideration in deter-
mining whether the defendant was at fault in distributing the
product.3 47 If the defendant can show that it carefully weighed
involved a television; d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel involved a carpet fabric; Sturm,
Ruger & Co. v. Day involved a gun; Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. involved a fabric
used in children's sleepwear.
343. 567 S.W.2d at 658.
344. See Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), a f'd,
623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.
1973); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
345. 567 S.W.2d at 658. Wangen also involved an automobile which contained a
defectively designed gas tank.
346. 567 S.W.2d at 658, 659. The Wangen court was also willing to impose puni-
tive damages upon Ford Motor Company if plaintiff could prove the necessary ele-
ments for a punitive award. 97 Wis. 2d at 271, 294 N.W.2d at 443.
347. In determining whether an act was unreasonable in garden-variety negligence
actions, the utility of the actor's conduct is a factor to be considered. RESTATEMENT
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the harm versus benefit to society, that it attempted to warn
consumers of any potential danger and it was unable to rem-
edy such defect in the product, then the defendant may have
a loosely defined "affirmative defense" to a punitive damage
claim.
3 48
Case law has not yet discussed this product benefit factor.
While it is inappropriate to state that a plaintiff must prove
the nonbeneficial nature of a product in order to recover puni-
tive damages, it is conceivable that a defendant might wish to
raise a "beneficial product" defense to a punitive damage
claim.
e. Defendant's Conduct in Marketing the Product Fell
Below Accepted Industry Standards
The consideration of whether a defendant's conduct fell
below the standards set by accepted industry practices is
nearly identical to a consideration of whether such defendant
was at fault in manufacturing or distributing the product.
Generally, this factor will be subsumed under the issue of
whether the defendant was at fault in its handling of the
product. Specific discussion of the industry-standards factor,
however, is warranted because several cases have explicitly
mentioned it.
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965):
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a
risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the
risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of
the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.
348. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 292 (1965) lists the factors to be
considered in assessing the utility of an actor's conduct-
In determining what the law regards as the utility of the actor's conduct for
the purpose of determining whether the actor is negligent, the following factors
are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to
be advanced or protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or pro-
tected by the particular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately ad-
vanced or protected by another and less dangerous course of conduct.
Note that factor (b) above calls the likelihood that a product actually does work into
question. In a negligence action, factor (b) would probably be evaluated according to
an objective standard of success. A punitive damage claim, however, may allow a sub-
jective, good faith belief in a product's potential by a defendant to negate the exis-
tence of a "conscious disregard."
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Toole involved expert testimony that the defendant, Rich-
ardson-Merrell, possessed sufficient information to induce it
to withdraw MER/29 from the market. 49 The court in Moore
noted that the defendant distributed Drano cans without
knowing their ability to withstand pressure, even though most
can manufacturers "as a custom knew the properties of their
containers. '"3 50 While neither court stated that a failure to
comply with industry standards was a requirement for a puni-
tive damage claim, it is clear that such failure by the defen-
dant was a factor in their decisions.
A more graphic example of the industry standards factor is
Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., wherein the defendant was ab-
solved of punitive liability because the fuel system design of
its trucks conformed to the design utilized by the remainder
of the national trucking industry. 5' The court made this find-
ing despite evidence that the defendant had performed no
crash tests on the fuel system or the truck and had main-
tained no records as to how the vehicles were performing in
accidents or as to the frequency of accidents involving
trucks.3 52
The Maxey case clearly shows the importance of the de-
fendant's conformance with industry standards. The court did
not find that such conformance absolved the defendant from
fault, but rather that it negated any finding that the defen-
dant had acted with that degree of gross negligence so as to
approximate a fixed purpose to bring about the harm which
resulted."'
Despite the preceding cases, it would appear that a defen-
dant's conformance with industry standards does not pre-
clude, as a matter of law, a finding that a manufacturer acted
with reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Gryc v. Day-
ton-Hudson Corp. found a manufacturer liable for punitive
damages despite conformance with federal standards.3" In
Gryc, the manufacturer had complied with the flammability
349. 251 Cal. App. 2d at - , 60 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
350. 116 IlM. App. 2d at 147, 253 N.E.2d at 649.
351. 450 F. Supp. at 962-64.
352. Id. at 963.
353. Id. at 964. See also 623 F.2d at 399.
354. 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub noma. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc,
101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
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standards set by the Flammable Fabrics Act.3 55 In holding the
manufacturer liable for punitive damages, the court reasoned
that since the manufacturer had knowledge that the federal
standards and tests were defective, compliance with the tests
did not preclude a finding that the manufacturer acted with
reckless disregard of plaintiff's safety.356 Moreover, the court
stated that the federal regulation did not preempt higher
safety standards set by the states. 57 The states have an inter-
est in protecting their citizens from the willful, wanton and
reckless manufacturer of flammable fabric, and compliance
with industry standards is only a factor in determining
whether defendant's conduct was "outrageous.
3 58
Similarly, other cases involving punitive damages in strict
liability litigation do not mention nonconformance with in-
dustry standards as a prerequisite to an award of punitive
damages. 5 9 Maxey itself echoes Gryc's reasoning by indicat-
ing that strict conformance with existing industry standards
will not always absolve a defendant from punitive liability.3 60
For these reasons, compliance or noncompliance with industry
standards is a consideration which is arguable by both parties
in attempting to determine a defendant's degree of fault; it is
not the sole determinative factor for either plaintiff or
defendant.361
355. 16 C.F.R. § 1610.3(2), 1610.4 (1977).
356. 297 N.W.2d at 733-34.
357. Id. at 735-37. The court rejected the manufacturer's argument that federal
regulation preempted any state law.
358. Id. at 737.
359. See, e.g., d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel, 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977); Gifiham
v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Mak-
ers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38
(Alaska 1979); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
360. 450 F. Supp. at 964: "Yet conformity to industry practice is not necessarily a
defense to fault. An entire industry may be negligent or inattentive. The circuit court
did not discuss whether an entire industry may be negligent or whether conformity
was a defense to fault."
361. A related concept which Professor Owen emphasized is the knowing violation
of applicable safety standards by a manufacturer. Professor Owen believes that if the
plaintiff can show the defendant's knowledge of its own failure to meet minimum
safety standards, then this showing allows an inference that the defendant acted in
conscious disregard of the product's defective condition. Professor Owen discusses
several trial court decisions involving such noncompliance and its effect on the puni-
tive damage issue. Owen, supra note 5, at 1355.
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f. Defendant's Fraudulent Conduct
As has been stated previously, Richardson-Merrell's con-
duct in the MER/29 litigation is considered the most blatant
example of culpable conduct in punitive damage cases involv-
ing mass producers.38 2 The striking feature of Richardson-
Merrell's conduct was its falsification of government reports
and the false advertising used in promoting MER/29.3 63 The
question of whether such fraudulent conduct is necessary to
warrant a punitive damage award has been answered in the
negative by cases since Toole.
Rinker,-3 Moores " and Gryc38 6 did not discuss any gov-
ernment reports or misleading advertising by defendants, al-
though each upheld punitive damage awards. But the most
extreme example of nonfraudulent conduct being punished by
an exemplary award is Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day.
38 7
Sturm, Ruger involved a .41 magnum single action revolver
which included four distinct hammer positions. The manufac-
turer of the gun placed a warning in the gun's instructions
that the firearm could discharge while the gun's hammer was
located in any of the four positions, including the safety and
loading positions. 68 The plaintiff was shot and injured by the
revolver when it discharged after it slipped from the plaintiff's
hand and was immediately grabbed by the plaintiff; the plain-
tiff had been loading the gun.38 9
Despite the defendant's warning, which certainly removed
362. See notes 46 and 272-76 and accompanying text, supra.
363. See notes 274-75 and accompanying text, supra.
364. 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
365. 116 Il. App. 2d 131, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), af'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d
103 (1970).
366. 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc,
101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
367. 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979).
368. Id. at 41:
WARNING: This revolver can be fired by excessive pull on the trigger from
either the safety notch position, indicated by No. 2 in Figure 1, or the loading
notch position indicated by No. 3 in Figure 1.
The loading notch and the safety notch provide only partial security. If
these notches are damaged, as they may be by "fanning", they offer no secur-
ity. Never depend on this or any other mechanical safety device to justify
pointing the firearm at any person.




any indication of fraudulent conduct by the defendant, the
court found that the punitive damage question was properly
submitted to the jury.-70 Hence, fraudulent misrepresentation
by a defendant is not a prerequisite for an exemplary award.
Nonetheless, a finding of fraudulent conduct by a defen-
dant will make a punitive damage award much easier to im-
pose. Evidence in the Gillham case indicated that Admiral
had pressured customers into taking back defective television
sets by assuring them that no more fires would develop; this
pressure tactic occurred even though Admiral knew of the in-
-adequacy of its television's insulation and fire containment
cage to withstand the heat generated by the sets trans-
former. '7 1 The jury imposed a $100,000 punitive award on Ad-
miral.372 d'Hedouville involved a defendant which had misrep-
resented the flammability of its product to the public.137
Fraudulent conduct by the defendant is not required for a
punitive damage award, but it certainly makes the imposition
of such an award more likely. If a plaintiff can show a con-
scious, active effort by the defendant to conceal a known dan-
ger, a punitive award is extremely likely.374
F. Summary
The foregoing discussion indicates that two "elements"
have been consistently present in each case awarding punitive
damages in a strict liability suit: (1) knowledge possessed by
the defendant, and (2) fault on the part of the defendant.
Every case reviewed showed that the defendant knew of the
defect in its product and of the potential harm which that de-
fect posed to consumers.
Without the existence of such knowledge, it is nearly im-
370. Id. at 47. The court did reduce the size of the punitive verdict from
$2,985,000 to $250,000.
371. 523 F.2d at 107.
372. Id. at 104.
373. 552 F.2d at 894. In Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 22 ATLA L. REP. 349 (Colo.
1980), the manufacturer attempted to cover up the dangerous side effects of the
device.
374. Owen, supra note 5, at 1329-34. Note the distinction between a conscious,
active effort to conceal and a mere failure to warn. The former is fraudulent conduct,
justifying a punitive award. The latter may show fault on the part of the defendant,
and may even be part of the basis for an exemplary award, but its importance is
dependent upon all of the other circumstances of the case.
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possible to prove that the defendant "recklessly" disregarded
the safety of others. It is conceivable that a defendant may
disregard the rights of others by failing to secure knowledge of
a defect (through inadequate testing or control procedures) in
its product, but such disregard would not seem to warrant a
punitive award unless the nature of the product is such that it
demands thorough testing procedures in order to protect the
public.3 715 In such a case, the defendant possesses knowledge of
the nature of the product and the serious consequences of any
possible defects in the product.
The fault "element" consists of a defendant failing to take
some action which the product and marketing circumstances
demand. Such failure may consist of inadequate testing proce-
dures, defective quality control, insufficient warnings or inade-
quate remedial procedures such as product recalls or
postmarketing warnings. This fault of the defendant can occur
during the premarketing or postmarketing stages.
In essence, this showing of fault involves nothing more
than proving the defendant acted negligently with respect to
the care it exercised in distributing the product to the public.
When combined with the defendant's knowledge, this fault or
negligence may rise to the level of "conscious disregard of the
safety of others"; on the other hand, it may not show enough
conscious disregard to justify a punitive award.
Although every punitive damage case will contain the pre-
ceding two elements, not every case which contains such ele-
ments will warrant a punitive award. Maxey, Kritser377 and
Thomas 8s all involved a defendant with knowledge of a seri-
ous defect, but none of the three cases allowed a punitive
damage award. The justification offered for each decision -
compliance with industry standards (Maxey), providing a
warning to consumers (Kritser), lack of defendant's awareness
375. One product that is of such a nature might be a new drug. Because of poten-
tial unkown chemical reactions with the human system, it may very well be "con-
scious disregard" by a drug manufacturer to fail to detect the drug's defect because of
inadequate test procedures. In this context, the knowledge possessed by the defen-
dant is knowledge that any drug may produce adverse effects on human beings and
therefore should be thoroughly tested.
376. 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 178), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
377. 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
378. 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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of the specific type of hazard presented (Thomas) - could be
viewed as showing that the defendant was not at fault at all
(thereby negating the second "element") or that the defen-
dant was not at fault enough to warrant a punitive award. It
would appear that the latter interpretation is more correct.
A plaintiff hoping to secure a punitive award in a strict
liability suit must plan to prove negligent conduct by the de-
fendant as well as the underlying strict liability action. He
must prove that the defendant knew of the product's defect
and its potential danger. He must organize a trial presentation
combining these two elements into a critical analysis of defen-
dant's conduct which proves how and why the defendant con-
sciously disregarded the rights of others.
V. STATUTORY LAw
Numerous statutes deal with the subject of punitive dam-
ages. Most of them are specific and provide for the recovery of
such damages for particular acts. However, there are very few
statutes dealing specifically with the allowance of punitive
damages in product liability cases.
A. Uniform Product Liability Act
Considerable impetus has been given to recognition of the
need for punitive damage legislation in the products field by
the promulgation of the Uniform Product Liability Act
(U.P.L.A.). This Act was drafted by the Federal Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability as a model for the states.379
The goal of the Task Force was to achieve uniformity in
product liability law.3 80
The punitive damage portion of the. Acts81 contains four
important elements: (1) the standard for establishing liability;
(2) the burden of proof; (3) judicial determination of the
amount; and (4) a listing of eight factors to be considered in
determining the amount to be awarded.
The U.P.L.A. uses the language "reckless disregard" to de-
scribe the requisite conduct for imposing punitive damages. 38 2
379. See note 120 supra.
380. Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act - A Brief OverView, 33 VND.
L. REv. 579 (1980).
381. See note 121 supra.
382. Model Act, supra note 120, at § 120(A).
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There has been some criticism that this standard is mislead-
ing, since it gives the impression that inadvertent conduct is
sufficient to justify a punitive damage award."' In states like
California, which have adopted a "conscious disregard" stan-
dard, the U.P.L.A.'s "reckless disregard" standard would ap-
pear not to be stringent enough. 84 However, "reckless disre-
gard" is defined in the analysis accompanying section 120 of
the Act as "conscious indifference to the safety of persons who
might be injured by the product."3 5 If the analysis is made
part of the statutory definition, then the fears expressed
above could be dispelled.
The second significant characteristic of the U.P.L.A. is
found in its adoption of a stricter burden of proof. It uses the
"clear and convincing" standard of proof rather than the nor-
mal "preponderance of the evidence" standard . 86 The analy-
sis accompanying section 120 indicates that the "clear and
convincing" burden of proof is an attempt to respond to the
criticism that punitive damages are a type of punishment and
should not be inflicted without some of the protections of
criminal trials.8 7 Requiring a greater quantum of evidence to
prove punitive damages is an important step in distinguishing
the recovery of punitive damages from that of compensatory
damages. It should be noted that the same result was accom-
plished by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Wangen
case.38
8
The U.P.L.A. also provides that the jury is to decide in the
first instance whether punitive damages are warranted, but
then the court is to determine the amount to be awarded. In
its discussion of this provision the Task Force notes that al-
lowing the judge to decide the amount is similar to the crimi-
nal practice where the jury decides if the accused is guilty and
the judge passes sentence. 8 9 An important result of having
383. Fulton, supra note 5, at 124-25.
384. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct. for the County of Sacramento, 49 Cal. App.
3d 28, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
385. Model Act, supra note 120.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). The Wangen court cited the
U.P.L.A. in analyzing the propriety of awarding punitive damages in product liability
actions. 97 Wis. 2d at 292-96, 294 N.W.2d at 454-57.
389. Model Act, supra note 120, at § 120(B).
[Vol. 65:1
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
the judge, not the jury, set the amount of punitive damages is
that evidence of wealth which might prejudice the jury in its
award of actual damages would not be relevant or admissible
until after the jury was discharged.390
The Act also lists eight factors that the court is to consider
in determining the amount of punitive damages.3 91 These fac-
tors were adapted from the Minnesota punitive damages stat-
ute.392 They provide some much-needed guidance in deter-
mining the amount to be awarded as punitive damages, and
result in a control mechanism which will temper the common
law's discretionary approach to such awards.
B. State Statutes
Only two states deal specifically with punitive damages as
they relate to product liability. These states are Connecti-
cut3s 3 and Oregon.394 A cursory examination of Connecticut's
390. Professor Owen discusses the advantages of having the judge determine the
punitive damage amount in Owen, supra note 5, at 1320-25.
391. Model Act, supra note 120, at § 120(B)(1)-(8).
392. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1981). The Minnesota statute
provides:
Subdivision 1. Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only
upon clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a will-
ful indifference to the rights or safety of others.
Subdivision 2. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a
master or principal because of an act done by an agent only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing
him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting
in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.
Subdivision 3. Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those
factors which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the
seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from the defendant's miscon-
duct, the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant, the duration of the
misconduct and any concealment of it, the degree of the defendant's awareness
of the hazard and of its excessiveness, the attitude and conduct of the defen-
dant upon discovery of the misconduct, the number and level of employees
involved in causing or concealing the misconduct, the financial condition of the
defendant, and the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed upon
the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including compensatory and puni-
tive damage awards to the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons, and
the severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant may be subject.
393. Pub. Act No. 79-483 § 8(a), 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts, reprinted in CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. (App. at 159) (West Supp. 1980).
394. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1979).
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statute illustrates that it contains the "reckless disregard"
standard and that the judge determines the amount of the pu-
nitive damage award. The section does not change the burden
of proof.395 Connecticut's limitation that the amount recover-
able as punitive damages shall not exceed twice that of actual
damages is in line with that state's approach to punitive
damages.3 96
Oregon's statute was drafted in 1979 and is admittedly
similar to the U.P.L.A. Unlike Connecticut, Oregon provides
for a "clear and convincing" burden of proof and enumerates
factors almost identical to those of the U.P.L.A. But Oregon
uses a standard for recovery that requires a "wanton disregard
for the health, safety, and welfare of others." The statute does
not provide for judicial determination of the amount but
leaves this to the jury.197
395. Pub. Act No. 79-483 § 8(a), 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts, reprinted in CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. (App. at 159) (West Supp. 1980), provides:
(a) Punitive damages may be awarded if the claimant proves that the
harm suffered was the result of the product seller's reckless disregard for the
safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the product.
If the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded, the
court shall determine the amount of such damages not to exceed an amount
equal to twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
396. In Connecticut, punitive damages serve a compensatory function. LeBlanc v.
Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301 (D. Conn. 1973).
397. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1979) provides as follows:
Punitive damages; evidence of defendant's ability to pay. (1) In a
product liability civil action, punitive damages shall not be recoverable unless
it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom pu-
nitive damages is sought has shown wanton disregard for the health, safety and
welfare of others.
(2) During the course of trial, evidence of the defendant's ability to pay
shall not be admitted unless and until the party entitled to recover establishes
a prima facie right to recover under subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Punitive damages, if any, shall be determined and awarded based
upon the following criteria:
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from
the defendant's misconduct;
(b) The degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood;
(c) The profitability of the defendant's misconduct;
(d) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
(e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of
the misconduct;
(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and
(g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon
the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not limited
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California, Georgia, Nevada, North Dakota and South Da-
kota,s98 in addition to Minnesota, 99 have general punitive
damage statutes applicable to product liability cases. Minne-
sota's is perhaps the most notable because it was used as a
basis for the factors listed in the U.P.L.A. for determining the
amount of punitive damages. Also, Minnesota has adopted the
"clear and convincing" burden of proof. None of the other
general punitive damage statutes includes any reference to the
burden of proof.
California's statute (section 3294) is typical of general pu-
nitive damage statutes:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of op-
pression, fraud or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff in
addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,400 "malice" as used in
this statute was interpreted in a product liability action as fol-
lows: "Where, as here, there is evidence that the conduct in
question is taken recklessly and without regard to its injurious
consequences, the jury may find malice in fact."401 This inter-
pretation comports with the "reckless disregard" standard
used in the Restatement4 2 as well as in the U.P.L.A.
North Dakota's statute (section 32-03-07) is identical to
California's except that the court or the jury may award puni-
tive damages. 40 3 The wording in Georgia's general statute is
different and provides as follows: "In every tort there may be
to, punitive damage awards to persons in situations similar to the claim-
ant's and the severity of the criminal penalties to which the defendant
has been or may be subjected.
398. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002 (1968); NEV.
Rnv. STAT. § 42.010 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32.03-07 (Supp. 1979); S.D. Com.
LAws ANN. § 21-3-2 (1979).
399. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1981). See note 392 supra.
400. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
401. Id. at 707, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
402. RESTATSmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
403. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (Supp. 1979) provides as follows:
When court or injury may give exemplary damages. In any action
for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, when the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the court
or jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
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aggravating circumstances, either in the act or the intention,
and in that event the jury may give additional damages, either
to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or as com-
pensation for the wounded feeling of the plaintiff.
'40 4
The South Dakota statute places an award of punitive
damages within the discretion of the jury. The statute pro-
vides as follows:,
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of op-
pression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, or in any case
of wrongful injury to animals, being subjects of property,
committed intentionally or by willful and wanton miscon-
duct, in disregard of humanity, the jury, in addition to the
actual damage, may give damages for the sake of example,
and by way of punishing the defendant.
405
The Texas Constitution provides for the imposition of pu-
nitive damages in cases of homicide.40 6 In Heil Co. v. Grant,
4°7
the Texas court used this section of the Texas Constitution as
a basis for justifying an award of punitive damages in a prod-
ucts liability action.40 The court stated that punitive damages
in products liability cases are available under the Texas Con-
sitution if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's conduct
was willful or grossly negligent or manifested conscious indif-
ference. 409 The court found no inherent inconsistency between
strict liability and punitive damages in products liability
actions.
The foregoing analysis illustrates a current dearth of legis-
lative activity in this area. As a result of the publication and
404. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002 (1968).
405. S.D. Comr. LAWS ANN. § 21-3-2 (1979).
406. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 26. Section 26 provides:
Every person, corporation, or company that may commit a homicide, through
willful act, or omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsible, in exemplary
damages, to the surviving husband, widow, heirs of his or her body or such of
them as there may be, without regard to any criminal proceeding that may or
may not be had in relation to the homicide.
407. 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
408. Id. In Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), af'd,
623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), art. 16, § 26 of the Texas Constitution was again used to
justify an award of punitive damages in a products liability action.
409. 534 S.W.2d at 926.
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distribution of the U.P.L.A. it is expected that more activity
will be seen in the near future.
410
410. See H.R. REP. No. 5626, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Many state legislatures
will be considering product liability legislation commencing with the 1981 sessions.
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